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
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THE
QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 556.—APRIL 1943.

Art. 1.—INDIA, AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1942.

1. *Official Reports of Parliamentary Debates*: Lords, Oct. 20, 1942; Commons, Sept. 10–11, Oct. 8, 1942.
2. *India's Fateful Hour*. By Sir William Barton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. John Murray, 1942.
3. *Pundits and Elephants*. By the Earl of Lytton, K.G., G.C.S.I. (Governor of Bengal 1922–27). Peter Davies.
4. *India and Democracy*. By Sir George Schuster, K.C.S.I., M.P., and Guy Wint. Macmillan.
5. *An Indian News Sheet*. By Sir Louis Stuart, C.I.E. Indian Empire Society, January 1943.
6. *From Many Angles*. By the Rt Hon. Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, G.C.S.I., M.P. (Governor of Bombay 1928–33). Chapters XIII–XX. Harrap & Co., 1943.

IN the Quarterly Review of last October I explained the circumstances in which Mr Gandhi and the General Committee of the Indian National Congress accepted the recommendation of their High Command or Working Committee that another Civil Disobedience Movement should be proclaimed. Although the Japanese enemy was at the gates, the Government was poorly supported by the Press in its combat with this domestic enemy. I quoted 'The Times' Special Correspondent's letter of August 18. On September 10, when the nature and extent of this 'stab in the back' by the Congress had become apparent, the Prime Minister, addressing the House of Commons, said that the broad principles of the Declaration which formed the basis of the Cripps Mission must be taken as the settled policy of the British Crown and Parliament. The Congress was 'a political organisation built round a particular machine and sustained by certain manu-
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facturing and commercial interests.* Other parties deplored its now openly revolutionary policy which was designed to paralyse rail and telephone communications and promote disorder, the looting of shops, sporadic attacks on the Indian police, accompanied from time to time by 'revolting atrocities,' the whole having the intention, or at any rate the effect, of hampering the defence of India against the Japanese invader who stood on the frontier of Assam and the eastern frontier of the Bay of Bengal. It had been necessary to suppress the central and provincial organs of the Congress; and Mr Gandhi and other principal leaders had been interned 'under conditions of the highest comfort and consideration' and would be kept out of harm's way till the trouble subsided. It was fortunate that the Congress had no influence with the martial races on whom the defence of British India, apart from British Forces, largely depends, many of whom were divided by unbridgeable religious gulfs from the Congress and would never consent to be ruled by them. 'Nor shall they ever be against their will, so subjugated.' During the last two months more than 140,000 new volunteers had come forward. The campaign against communications was now breaking down, and the public services were working. In the Punjab and Bengal, provincial ministers responsible to their legislatures were standing at their posts. In most cases the rioters had been successfully dealt with by the Indian police, whose behaviour as well as that of the Indian official class generally deserved the highest praise. All necessary support would be given to the Viceroy and his Executive in the firm but tempered measures which they were taking. Large reinforcements of troops had reached India and there was a bigger number of white soldiers there than at any time since the British connection. In answer to a question he said that the reinforcements had been sent to protect the great masses of the Indian people from Japanese invasion. The fact that they were there undoubtedly added to the general stability which happily prevailed.

On the following day, Mr Greenwood for the Labour

* See Barton's 'India's Fateful Hour,' Chapters II and IV.; Sykes, pp. 361, 464.

party criticised this address as unhelpful in form and not likely to have a good effect either on Anglo-Indian relations or in the U.S.A. His party had supported the action of the Government of India in arresting the Congress leaders 'as a timely and necessary precaution. But we must show generosity of spirit and do our best to come to an understanding with the people of India.' A debate started and was marked by a straightforward speech from the Secretary of State. Was it expected, he asked, that at a moment when our position in the Middle East, our loyal ally China, the whole Allied cause had been saved from peril by the successfully firm attitude of the Government of India, the Prime Minister should exchange 'that ringing confident tone which had so often sustained the House in dark hours for a muffled apology in a minor key?' Very soon after Sir Stafford Cripps had left India it had become clear that under Mr Gandhi's inspiration the Congress was steadily swinging towards a policy of direct defiance aimed at the paralysis of the existing Government of India. Gandhi had said in July that he could not afford to wait. He must 'even at obvious risks, ask people to resist slavery.' When the Working Committee had on July 16 issued a resolution urging the people to resist compensated requisitions of boats, vehicles, or lands, Gandhi had added: 'No doubt the non-violent way is always the best, but when that does not come naturally, the violent way is both necessary and honourable, and inaction here is rank cowardice and unmanly.' In the course of July the Government of Madras had come across instructions which were being issued by the Andhra Congress Committee to its members. Methods of hostility recommended were urging Government officers to resign their jobs, arranging labour strikes, picketing of shops, stopping trains by pulling communication cords, travelling without tickets, cutting telegraph and telephone wires. Finally the picketing of troops was to come. At last, when the Central Congress Working Committee had endorsed all these designs, by an overwhelming majority the Government, in Mr Jinnah's words, 'instead of waiting to be hit, hit first.'* Then

* For previous bitter experiences of the perils of the opposite course see Sykes.

came a series of noisy hooligan demonstrations and concomitant attempts at sabotage in certain directions and certain parts of India. The attention specially paid to the destruction of controls and signalling apparatus, the damaging of bridges and roads, all indicated a carefully planned scheme of attack, not only on the daily life, but on the safety of the country. It was mainly concentrated on the vital strategic area now exposed to Japanese attack, the main area of India and India's armed strength, as well as the area which would most prejudice the carrying of coal from the mines to the factories. General directions had been given by the Congress, and in accordance with those general directions by a particular provincial committee. In Bihar, a vital strategic area, disturbance was particularly violent, about sixty-five police stations having been attacked. At Chimar in the Central Provinces, a magistrate and police officers had been done to death, after refusing the offer of their lives if they joined Congress and resigned from Government service. At Ashti, in the same province, two constables were burnt alive with kerosene. A police officer suffered a similar fate in Bihar. Had the organisation of the movement been allowed to develop for several weeks while the smoke-screen of resolutions and discussions about how and under what conditions the British Government was to clear out of India was being discussed, the result might well have been disastrous. All the evidence which had come in made it clear that the whole campaign of disorder and revolt was the outcome of the application locally of the general guidance which the Congress leaders had inspired.

In all fairness the British Government could claim that all constructive proposals with regard to the Indian problem of recent years had come from here. Action on the part of Mr Gandhi had invariably been wrecking. In this particular instance it was meant to be not only wrecking but deliberately coercive. Gandhi was encouraged, no doubt, by the mildness of the Government of India, in the hope that in the face of a general violence campaign the Government would in one respect or other give way. It did not.

In conclusion Mr Amery pointed out the elements of unity in the complicated and difficult Indian situation,

the unity of administration, law, and trade which Britain had created, the long peace that India had enjoyed, the interlocking of interests throughout the country, the wish of Indians to see India self-governing, free but united, and not reverting to anarchy. It was not beyond reason to hope that under some constitutional form or other, at some time or other—he hoped not too distant—they would be able to agree upon a constitution under which they could not only live, but develop the wonderful natural resources of their country and the great gifts of her people.

In the course of the Debate, Sir Stanley Reed made a moving speech on the difficulties of District Officers and police in India just now. 'I should like,' he said, 'some of those who are very glib in their condemnation of Indian policy and the Indian Government to place themselves in the position of a District Magistrate at a time like the present. He is often hundreds of miles from any form of assistance; he has the responsibility of the district on his shoulders with not a highly efficient support behind him. More than half the District Magistrates are Indians drawn from the Civil Service, and they deserve our heartfelt sympathy and support at this time. I would go farther and endorse those words which the Prime Minister has spoken about the gallantry and courage of the Indian police. Our own police run little or no risk in this country of being murdered by an overwhelming mob. In the face of that risk the Indian police are doing their duty with a calm resolution and courage which deserves and should obtain from this House its wholehearted sympathy, admiration, and support.'* He also spoke of the dismay with which those who have worked and lived in India, and have received warm-hearted and generous friendship of many of the Indian people, have seen 'the approach of war to India in circumstances which caused us no small heart-burnings.' But we could not close our eyes to the plainest facts.

Reactions in India to the Debate were various. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce fully supported the Viceroy and his Executive Council in whatever steps might be necessary to 'restore the tranquillity of India and counter

* See Sykes, p. 390.

any movement which hampers the defence of the country or encourages fifth-column activity. It approved of the Premier's statement of policy. Mr Jinnah said that his statement that the Muslim League opposed Congress did not mean that it supported the Government. It could enter no provisional Government unless Pakistan was explicitly granted. Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, late premier of the Punjab, told the Press on September 11, that his view was that the Congress and the Muslim League were each trying not to solve the problem but 'to browbeat the British into its accepting its particular demands.' As Premier of the Punjab he would not care to accept any national Government about whose war policy there was any doubt. He did not want his soldiers who were fighting to-day to be treated as traitors to-morrow.

On September 15, speaking to the Imperial Assembly at Delhi, Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member of Council, drew attention to the attacks on railways and other communications, started simultaneously in widely separated parts of India. Much of the damage done must have required special instruments which could not have been procured at a moment's notice. The technical knowledge displayed by the saboteurs and other facts were inconsistent with the theory that the disturbances were a spontaneous outburst arising from the arrest of the Congress Members. When outbreaks had occurred, they were the direct result of political influences backed, it was suspected, by ample funds.* Troops, British and Indian, had been called out in sixty places to the help of the civil authorities. They were used to prevent a violent rebellion intended to overthrow the Government responsible for the safety of all. The disturbances were not a people's movement. On September 18, this speech was strongly endorsed by Sir Sultan Ahmad, the Muslim Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, who added that national government could not be imposed, but must be the creation of the fairly unanimous will of the people and further had to satisfy a crucial test that 'its main purpose was to resist enemies to the last drop of its blood.' On September 24, the last day of the session of the Imperial Legislative Council, the same

* Barton, p. 16.

speaker made a considerable impression on his audience by revealing the cold-blooded murder of two Air Force officers off duty. Resolutions were published by the National Liberal Federation and by a body calling itself the Indian Peasant Organisation, which were not of a helpful character.

On October 8, a further debate on India took place in the Commons when the India and Burma Temporary Miscellaneous Provisions Bill was introduced by the Secretary of State for allowing arrangements to continue as they were in provinces where ordinary constitutional machinery had broken down, for assisting the Indian Authorities to maintain law and order under conditions arising out of the war, and for matters arising from the fact that the Government of Burma was temporarily functioning on the soil of India. The Bill was debated and an amendment, moved by the leader of the Independent Labour Party, was lost by 360 votes against seventeen. Mr Amery again explained that the consistent aim of Gandhi and his followers had been not the progressive transformation of British rule into Indian rule, but its direct supersession at some given moment by the Congress as the result of some upheaval to which the Crown and Parliament would surrender. To that end the organisation of Congress had been steadily strengthened and ever more rigidly centralised. 'There is,' he said, 'no more dangerous modern political phenomenon than that of the revolutionary leader, who by his direct personal appeal to the masses is not only able to control an immensely powerful organisation, but can make impossible all resistance to his arbitrary wishes on the part of his associates. His appeal may be to the German passion for brute force or it may be to Hindu mysticism and reverence for the ascetic. The same type of dictatorship emerges. In the case of India it has been steadily used to build up power for an eventual trial of strength, while rejecting all compromise, either with the British Government or with other elements in India. When the Congress High Command allowed its ministers to take office in the Provinces where its organisation had secured majorities, it did so avowedly to wreck the Constitution and meanwhile to increase its hold upon the whole machinery of provincial life.'

The Bill was also debated in the Lords, where the Lord Chancellor said that the fissures in Indian life ran so deeply that until there was agreement how they are to be bridged it would be quite impossible to build out of British goodwill self-government which would be generally acceptable to the great Communities. The whole thing might split on communal feeling. The Duke of Devonshire, Under-Secretary of State, complained of constant pressure on the Government to make some speculative move, of speeches and articles which encouraged the Congress party by blaming His Majesty's Government for the present deadlock, urging that the next move lay with them. As long as action of this kind persisted the organisers of disorder in India would believe that they had only a few more outrages to commit to enforce a large-scale retreat on the part of the Government. The exhortations to 'take the initiative' or 'do something constructive' came readily to men's lips and pens, but what did they really mean? Lord Crewe said that there was one fact that divided the Government from the extreme attitude of the Congress. In matters of policy or administration somebody must have the final decision, the last word, and the Congress had not so far budged from the attitude that they should have the last word. Lord Addison, the Leader of the Opposition, exhorted the Government not to say that this was their last offer. But the Congress party's conception of Democracy in fact meant the domination of the rest of the people by a section, and was not one with which we could have any affinity. The Lord Chancellor denied that our own proposals had been cancelled. The objections of Parties to them were for absolutely opposite reasons. The Bill passed without a division. So ended Indian Parliamentary debates for the year. Before its close the Government of India policy was to be amply justified.

On the morning of October 11, a cyclone rose in the Bay of Bengal which lasted till the early hours of the following day. On the afternoon of the 16th a high tidal wave, forced up by the cyclone, broke into the main land and devastated a considerable part of the large Midnapur district extending to the neighbouring Calcutta area. It was accompanied by very heavy rains which destroyed or severely damaged great numbers of roughly

built houses. Altogether 11,000 persons were killed and destruction of property spread far and wide. It was afterwards ascertained that seventy-five per cent. of the cattle had been lost. In fact a whole thickly populated area had suffered one of these terrible natural calamities which from time to time visit India. Relief works were organised with all possible expedition by the civil officers concerned, but the district had for years been 'a Congress stronghold' and what this could mean was now to be brought home to *the sufferers concerned*. Before responsible officers could reach the area of gravest disaster some British soldiers stationed there had done their utmost to share rations with the distressed, and provide milk for children. The task was heavy and difficult in any case and was made much more so by obstructions offered by a disaffected section of the people who before the cyclone struck had been organising a reign of terror. Road and telegraph communications, police stations, post offices, other government buildings, water-borne craft and ferries had been damaged or destroyed. Government servants had been detained or evicted and sometimes cruelly beaten. Participation in such activities had been secured by intimidation, accompanied by threats of destruction of property. A young man was stabbed because his uncle had seconded the efforts of the local authorities to restore law and order. The rebels had established centres of administration, pseudo law-courts, places for the training of volunteers and military or police stations. Servants of the regular Government had been seized and beaten. 'A representative of one well-known humanitarian organisation had been prevented from purchasing rice for distribution and members of a charitable society administering relief had reported that apprehension of danger from hooligans prevented them from establishing as many centres as they desired.' The communiqué summed up: 'It is abundantly clear that those responsible for the disturbances at Midnapur are determined that humanitarian considerations shall not deter them from exploiting conditions for their own political ends. The above summarises only in general terms the great mass of details referring to the lawless activities inspired by those who are responsible for the disturbances, and it is given in order that the public may understand the

difficulties under which both official and non-official organisations are working there. The Government are determined to take whatsoever measures are necessary to ameliorate conditions for the victims of the cyclone and tidal wave and to rehabilitate them.' The communiqué discloses the bullying and tyranny practised by 'parallel district government.'

On November 12, Mr Rajagopalachari, who had once belonged to but had left the Congress Working Committee and had been recently trying to mediate between party leaders, sought for an interview with the Viceroy and asked for permission to see Mr Gandhi, stating that he represented no party or organisation and only spoke for himself. Lord Linlithgow said that as the attitude of the Congress leaders remained entirely unchanged and they had expressed no regret for the policy that had for over three months produced so much violence, crisis, and bloodshed, and yet had given no sign of any change of heart, their attitude was apparently unchanged although their leaders were fully aware of the evil consequences of their policy. In the absence of any such change, there could be no question of any special facilities for discussion with the persons under restraint for revolutionary activities. This was the considered policy of the Government of India. It was condemned by Mr Rajagopalachari and by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a Liberal leader who expressed with regret his 'personal opinion that the solution of the Indian problem should be entrusted to fresh hands.'

On December 17, Lord Linlithgow, addressing the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, said that all his efforts and those of His Majesty's Government and Secretary of State to bring about the measure of inter-parties agreement necessary for a workable scheme had failed to achieve the desired object at which they had aimed and still aimed. Sometimes it even seemed that their endeavours to assimilate misconceptions and misunderstandings had tended to widen the gulfs between those whom they desired to unite. With deep regret he saw that day little to encourage him to hope that the conflicting claims of the great Parties were likely to be in any degree abated.

'The Times' correspondent reported* that the whole

* 'The Times,' December 22.

speech was 'a salutary reminder to all that the future of India' should be considered 'not only in the light of the terms on which the various communities would live together, but in reference to the conditions in which they would live in relations to the outside world after the war, in which case the advantages of unity would seem more apparent than they are now.' The point is forcibly put on page 362 of Schuster and Wint. 'Would not,' Schuster asks, 'the position of a divided India, with all the friction which must ensue between the divided parts, be an invitation to the predatory powers which seek to incorporate India within their own special brand of a new order? In the world as it is to-day strength and security are best found in unity. Division might well prove a luxury to be paid for by becoming almost defenceless against the foreign aggressor.'

On December 7 it was announced that Lord Linlithgow's term of office had been extended by six months. This was a third extension. It had in 1941 been extended for a year and again for another year in 1942. But now he is to hold office up to October 1943, longer than any of his predecessors since 1858. 'The Times of India' and the 'Statesman' both expressed approval of the arrangement. 'The Pioneer' (Lucknow—Indian-owned) remarked, 'Only an extreme sense of public duty could have persuaded Lord Linlithgow to a further extension of his term of office. At the present time he may not appear to particular sections of the Indian people as a man worthy of gratitude and respect, but we are confident that when the turmoil subsides here in India and beyond its borders, Lord Linlithgow's services will receive their just appreciation and that he will be ranked among the greatest Viceroys of India.' Mr Ambedkar, who represents the Depressed classes on the Viceroy's new Executive Council, said that he was 'very pleased at the news,' and Sir B. P. Singa Roy, President of the National Liberal Federation of India, commented: 'The choice of a new Viceroy in the present war situation and the unsettled condition of the country was by no means an easy one. His Majesty's Government acted wisely by further extending Lord Linlithgow's term. His experience will be an asset to the British Government in India.'

An appreciation from an opposite quarter is worth
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recalling here. 'On Sept. 17, 1940, the Viceroy saw Mr Gandhi who in a three and a half hours interview raised the question of free speech, contending that this was the test of true adherence to democracy and that the prosecution of Congress workers for speeches designed to dissuade Indians from cooperation in the war effort should cease. The Viceroy was unable to agree that more than the rights given to conscientious objectors in the United Kingdom should be given in India and Mr Gandhi intimated that civil disobedience would have to be resorted to.'* On Oct. 15, 1940, he issued his 'Individual Civil Disobedience' programme and apparently sanctioned preparations for a more serious effort. On October 5 he had published a long statement which began thus— 'Before I make my statement I think it necessary to say a few words about Lord Linlithgow. He is straight in his talk and deliberate in his language. He is never equivocal nor leaves you in doubt as to his meanings. He conveys the most unpalatable decisions with a calmness and courtesy which make you think you have heard no harsh or hard decision. He listens to your argument with a patience and attention I have never known in any Viceroy or high functionary. He is never ruffled or discourteous. With all this, however, he is not to be easily moved from his position. He meets you with his decision already made on the matter under discussion. He takes care not to let you know that it is so. But there is no doubt that his decision is unchangeable. He is not receptive. He has amazing confidence in the correctness of his judgment. He does not believe in a Gentleman's or any other agreement. I have always believed that after the Irwin-Gandhi Pact,† the British authorities decided that there should be no more such pacts. Whatever they wanted to do they must do independently. Lord Linlithgow and I have become friends never to be parted, be the differences between us as great as great can be.'‡

As I wrote in an article on 'Indian Politics in 1940-41' (Quarterly of October 1941), two months before the long interview with Mr Gandhi, the Viceroy had issued on the part of His Majesty's Government the important Declara-

* Government of India Communiqué.

† Sykes, pp. 410, 418.

‡ 'Statesman,' Oct. 10, 1940.

tion of Aug. 8, 1940. In spite of this and in spite of his enthusiastic friendship for Lord Linlithgow, the Mahatma proceeded with his campaign of 'individual civil disobedience,' waged at the expense of his followers. But although he was allowed to do this, the Government evidently considering that the results would be comparatively ineffective, as in fact they were though mischievous, the Mahatma was disappointed. Then came the Cripps Mission and all that followed.

The temporarily sombre aspect of the war and the fall of Singapore probably impelled him to his last disastrous gamble and to actively militant preparations. He finally jettisoned the friendship which apparently he had valued so highly in 1940 together with his pretensions to staunch non-violence. As Mr Wint tells us in 'India and Democracy' (p. 161), on the outbreak of the war he had exclaimed, 'What is the value to India of freedom if Britain and France fail?' Who would then have believed that in less than three years, when the danger to Britain had apparently deepened and Japan was threatening India itself, he would have smothered these genuine convictions with such complete success?

Mr Jinnah, although exerting his influence to prevent communal rioting, is intransigent in respect of Pakistan. In 'The Times' of October 2 its Special Correspondent wrote: 'The chief political parties are in revolt against the Government, the lesser ones are barking at its heels, and the so-called Moderates are querulous . . . each party and community appreciates that the nature of any arrangement which they may accept will affect for better or worse their position when a final settlement is made after the war. Consequently, all that the Parties have been able to suggest in place of the Cripps scheme are sets of particular and irreconcilable claims, and the energies of each are largely directed to trying to jockey the Government into the position of having to decide and act in its favour.' This is a distressful state of affairs. But as Lord Lytton, with five years' experience of governing in Bengal, has recently written, 'fortunately for the peace of India the rank and file are not nearly so intransigent as their leaders. They do in fact cooperate with each other in all the daily business of life. They work together in business, on district boards, on municipal

corporations, in Legislative Councils and sometimes in the same ministry. It is only at rare intervals when their religious feelings become inflamed that they treat each other as enemies and clashes occur.* Extreme sectional politics are now an additional source of conflict. But the war, which at times has heartened the foes of order, has now taken a far brighter turn and the National Defence Council at Delhi ended their first session since the re-appointment of Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy by placing on record their gratification at his extension of office ('The Times,' January 25). They had received reports on the Calcutta air-raids, also a first-hand account from the Premier of Bengal of the reaction of the public to these attacks together with a eulogy of the efficiency of the city's anti-aircraft and fighter defences. Their attitude was one of keen attention and they discussed suggestions for increased recruitment of technicians for the Air Force. These times, too, have fully disclosed the fine metal of such Indians as Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, the gallant and noble premier of the Punjab, who was taken from his province and from India just before the close of the year, deeply and widely lamented. Very recently too India has suffered the loss of the Maharaja of Bikanir, Hindu prince, statesman, and soldier. Many others have given their lives on the battlefield. If they are gone their example and spirit remain to help and guide. It is that spirit, it is the spirit that moved the Viceroy's Indian Councillors who joined in signing the Government's reply † to the Congress defiance of August 8 that alone can pilot India into tranquil seas. But her economic problems will need all the help and wise counsel she can muster when the war is over.

The members of Lord Hardinge's Government who signed the despatch of Aug. 25, 1911, gave elaborate and far-sighted reasons for recommending that the capital should be shifted from Calcutta to Delhi. But the danger of an attack on India from the East by sea and from the air was not then mentioned or foreseen. They could only know and prophesy in part. We, too, now see

* 'Pundits and Elephants,' p. 152.

† For the text of this reply see the appendix to Barton's 'India's Fateful Hour.'

the future 'through a glass darkly.' But our Government has led both us at home and the Empire peoples abroad to survey it in a brave and resolute spirit. The United States, too, are with us. For some time units of their forces have aided in protecting India from Japanese invasion. On Jan. 8, 1943, Mr William Phillips arrived at New Delhi as the personal representative of President Roosevelt, determined 'to know India as well as he can' and to report to the President. He has been well received by the Press.

On February 11 'The Times' announced that Mr Gandhi had once more resorted to a fast and published some correspondence with the Viceroy which had preceded this step. The case against the Congress and its leader in regard to the 'civil disobedience' campaign was clearly and convincingly put by Lord Linlithgow's letter of February 5.

VERNEY LOVETT.

Art. 2.—PLANNING, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UTHWATT, BARLOW, AND SCOTT REPORTS.

THE British people have placed themselves unreservedly at the disposal of the Government for war purposes, and are reasonably demanding that their sacrifices shall, after the defeat of the enemy, stimulate a vigorous and constructive policy. The Government is wisely looking well before it leaps, and for the purpose is using many experienced persons outside the national war staff to marshal and review the facts. These special Committees correctly link together, and not all of them have yet reported.

In respect of the future use of land, planning has been focussed for discussion by the Uthwatt Committee,* for which the way was well prepared by the Barlow Commission, which in 1940 reported on 'the distribution of the industrial population,' and the Scott Committee, which in 1942 reported on 'land utilisation in rural areas.'

The problem before the Barlow Commission was to

* Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment.

make clear how far the present distribution of industry, which private enterprise has skilfully developed for reasons mainly economic, now requires greater State control for reasons mainly social. 'The choice of location for industry in the past,' wrote the Commission, 'has been mainly at the discretion of the employer or entrepreneur: the State has not directly intervened to control or direct it. Industry in Great Britain . . . has prospered exceedingly during the period of unfettered control, and arbitrary or unreasonable interference with the freedom of the individual industrialist to select his own location might seriously handicap development.'

'When,' runs a counterbalancing passage of the report, 'conditions affecting the health or well-being rather than the wealth of the State demand attention, when slums, defective sanitation, noise, air pollution, and traffic congestion are found to constitute disadvantages, if not dangers, to the community . . . then modern civilisation may well require a regulating authority . . . to take reasonable measures for the protection of the general national interests.'

The Commission had two points especially impressed upon them. First, the probability that in the next thirty years the population will be stationary or declining. Second, the outstanding congestion in London and the Home Counties, which already include one-quarter of the population, and tend to increase. Against the advantages in large towns of medical and educational services, and of facilities for social intercourse and many amenities, there were represented such disadvantages as the lower standards of health, which better planning could rectify, and increasing transport congestion 'burdensome on the time, money, and health of the community.' Rising demand for unchanging areas of land has driven prices to levels often prohibitive of progress. 'The cost of comparatively insignificant street widenings,' quoted the Commission, 'sometimes works out in the Metropolis at a rate exceeding 2l. millions a mile,' and . . . 'assistance from the Exchequer and from local rates may amount in the case of a flat in central London to more than three times that in the case of a cottage.' 'The urban development of greater London' ran the evidence of the L.C.C., 'already exceeds the aggregate, which would have been

desirable on general principles of town-planning and in the interests of the well-being of the population of London.' The Federation of British Industries, while 'opposed to compulsion on industrialists in the matter of location . . . were prepared to accept a policy of discouragement of settlement in certain areas and encouragement of settlement elsewhere.'

After receiving the evidence of over one hundred Government Departments and Organisations and of numerous individuals, the majority of the Commission reached the following conclusions :

1. That the present concentrations of industry and industrial population involve serious handicaps to the nation's life, and require remedial treatment by the Government.

2. That a 'National Industrial Board' should be established to give effect to State action as regards 'making research into, advising upon, and regulating the location of industry.'

3. That the national policy should aim at the following objectives :

- (a) The 'redevelopment of congested urban areas,' accompanied by the necessary dispersal of industry and the industrial population.

- (b) The provision of suitable alternative accommodation, whether in garden suburbs, satellite towns, trading estates, or by the development of existing small towns or regional centres.

- (c) 'A reasonable balance of industrial development . . . throughout the various regions . . . of Great Britain, coupled with appropriate diversification . . . in each region.'

4. That immediate powers are required for the Central Planning Authority 'to regulate the establishment of additional industrial undertakings' in London and the Home Counties. Such negative powers 'to be capable of extension later to other areas.'

The main conclusions of the Scott Committee, reached by eleven out of the twelve members, were that planning must be national as well as local, and that the latter must be compulsory and not, as hitherto, permissive. They recommended a Minister of National Planning,

assisted by a Commission with a research staff, and power of compulsory acquisition of agricultural land by the State in the interests of national planning or of providing agricultural efficiency. They advised the review of all current planning schemes, and the preparation now of a five-year programme, which could commence directly the war ends. 'To delay,' they wrote, 'planning and the legislation to carry the plans into effect until the time for action is upon us—the end of the war—we believe to be a fatal error.'

The Committee did not recommend the nationalisation of land. 'Throughout this report,' runs their para. 236, 'our emphasis has been on the importance of an adequate control over the development of land. We are aware that one method of obtaining control is by the purchase of the land; but we consider it important to emphasise that the changes we recommend are not contingent on the ownership of the land by the State or by public authorities: they are contingent upon adequate powers of control and regulation. A change from private to public ownership would still leave the necessity for the planning and development which we have recommended.'

In an 'Additional Memorandum on Valuation and Rating,' which is signed by five members of the Committee, the compulsory registration of title and a standard valuation of all real property were recommended. This 'declared value' for any holding would be declared by the owner, and be suitably apportioned between sites and buildings. It would relate to conditions existing on March 31, 1939, and be adjusted annually by the Finance Act, or other statutory means, to changes in the value of money. It would serve as a value basis for taxation, rating, and insurance, and for acquisitions by the State or public authorities.

Of the objects to be sought through the planning of rural areas, the Committee started with the increase and improvement of rural housing, combined with better rural supplies of electricity, gas, and water. To these essentials they desired to have added sufficient recreational areas, a central institute in every village, and adequate shops. They urged that new building should be on the poorer soils in or near villages, and the need of stricter control over all non-agricultural use of rural land.

Professor Dennison, in a minority report, differed from his colleagues mainly on the extent to which agriculture should be given special consideration in rural planning. The majority report emphasised the need of such consideration. 'One of the major difficulties of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932,' they wrote, 'is that it wholly ignored agriculture. . . . We recommend . . . that in future all considerations affecting land use should be taken into account in land planning and we consider that in country areas one of the most important of these must be the agricultural aspect. The Government has already recognised this . . . in our terms of reference. . . .' 'It has also been stated that the Government will seek to avoid the diversion of productive agricultural land to other purposes. . . .' 'In the light of these statements and of our terms of reference, and in view of the importance which we attach to a prosperous countryside and the maintenance of agriculture, we recommend that in planning rural land particular importance should be attached to agricultural considerations.' Professor Dennison doubted if agriculture is able to afford the higher standards desirable. He thought that land should be put to its most economical use in the interests of the general standard of living, and that the rural population might lose rather than gain if the dispersal of industries, in relief of excess urban concentration, is discouraged.

The majority desired educational efforts to produce a better understanding between town and country. They urged that the countryside be protected from disfigurement by advertisements, ill-designed petrol stations, and wayside cafés, and at the same time that townsmen, when they come into the country, should find adequate camping grounds, and a better system of foot- and bridle-paths.

Four main problems of the land were referred to the Uthwatt Committee.

1. The immediate precautions necessary to prevent post-war reconstruction being prejudiced.
2. An objective analysis of compensation and betterment.
3. The possibility of stabilising the value of land needed for development.
4. Powers desirable for land-purchase by the State.

The Committee pointed out that, in June 1942, of the total area in Great Britain available for planning only 48 per cent. was covered by approved resolutions to plan, while plans actually in operation affected only 3 per cent. In order to give time for the elaboration under favourable conditions of a long-term policy, they recommended the immediate vesting in a Central Planning Authority of power to control building and other developments throughout the country, and that all developed land should be assumed subject to a resolution to plan. As a check on land speculation they advised an announcement that compensation would be based on values existing on March 31, 1939. And to facilitate progress in local planning they recommended the early definition of reconstruction areas, each of which would be redeveloped as a whole.

In dealing with the problem of Compensation and Betterment, the Committee analysed to destruction the existing State schemes. These seek, where State planning worsens the value of a private owner's land, to secure for him fair compensation; and, where the value is bettered, to recover from him for the State a fair share of the betterment. In respect of attempts at equitable compensation, the Committee pointed out that the restriction of an owner's rights to the extent necessary to secure 'the duties of neighbourliness' may correctly be enforced by the State without payment of compensation, but that beyond such degree of State action compensation should be paid. 'It will always be a matter of difficulty,' wrote the Committee, 'to determine the point at which the accepted obligations of neighbourliness or citizenship are exceeded and an expropriation is suffered—particularly as the standard of obligation will vary with the political theory of the day. Moreover, public requirements may go beyond a negative restriction and demand, in the national interest, positive user of a particular character.'

In respect of the recovery of betterment by the State, the Committee examined the two main methods which have been employed—direct-charge and set-off. Of direct-charge they wrote, 'It is difficult . . . to determine the extent of the area within which values have been influenced by a particular provision or work,' or, 'to

prove the extent to which any increase in value can properly be attributed to the provision or work as distinct from what is due to . . . expenditure by the owner . . . growth of population . . . improved transport facilities, etc. . . . We agree with the Barlow Commission that the realisation of substantial sums by way of betterment cannot safely be expected.' 'Set-off' involves a rough and ready settlement, which assumes that a planning action by the State has worsened a property in some ways and bettered it in others, and that the two may be regarded as cancelling out. The system has two defects. First, betterment is only recovered from those owners entitled to compensation because their land is being acquired, and there are likely to be others who benefit and yet make no return to the State. Second, the amount of compensation will normally be only the value of the small area of land taken for that improvement, whereas the betterment may be much more extensive and valuable. As a summary of their betterment criticisms the Committee wrote, 'while we unhesitatingly accept the principle of "betterment" as being a fair one, we are convinced that the segregation of "betterment" which is particularly ascribable to planning is impracticable. . . .' 'We accordingly recommend that, in view of the difficulties inherent in the present system of collecting betterment under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, and its failure to produce practical results, that system should be abandoned.'

After this destructive analysis of existing methods for adjusting compensation and betterment the Committee proposed the following substitutes. The need for compensation in future could, they suggested, be removed completely, if the State would purchase now the existing development rights in all undeveloped land, thus confining the owner's future rights to agricultural user. And, as a practicable way of recovering betterment, they proposed the establishment now of standard values for all developed sites, to be followed by quinquennial revaluations, and a levy by the State of a proportion of any increases above the standard values. These two proposals are the outstanding factors of the Report. They need the fullest consideration, for they involve the nationalisation, by stages, of the land.

The Committee reached their simple solution of the problem for compensation for development rights by turning their backs on discordant facts. 'Land,' they wrote, 'is held by a large number of owners whose individual interests lie in putting their own particular piece of land to the most profitable use . . . whereas the need of the State and of the community is to ensure the best use of all land of the country irrespective of financial return. If planning is an advantage to the community . . . a means must be found for removing the conflict between private and public interest.' The Committee's means was simple, namely, to suggest a favourable price for the community to pay for its immediate development needs, and to declare non-existent the highly probable large balance of floating development values. 'Potential development value,' they admitted, 'is by nature speculative . . . and necessarily a floating value, and it is impossible to predict with certainty where the float will settle.' They might have added the important fact that the time of settlement, also, is unpredictable. They then estimated that the value of land potentially suitable for development at any one time is about three times the value of the land actually needed at that time for development. There is, however, no good reason why all this temporary surplus may not at a later date be so required, a point which the Committee ignored. Since planning is needed for the benefit of the community, if any financial loss is involved it is fair that this should be suffered by the community, and not by a few unluckily placed owners of one kind of property. That, however, was not the Committee's view. 'Compensation,' ran their report, 'will be paid on the basis that there is to be fixed a single sum representing the fair value to the State of the development rights taken as a whole.' This 'General Compensation Fund' was modestly, and perhaps wisely, left by the Committee to 'be fixed by the Government after taking expert advice.' The sum, they pointed out, 'is a matter of estimation and not of arithmetical computation,' but they suggested that 'it is possible fairly to ascertain the proper amount of the Fund.' As an illustration only, and not as an accurate estimate, the Committee recorded that there is an annual development of about 45,000 acres of undeveloped land averaging 200 $\frac{1}{2}$ per acre in

value; and that these 9½ million per annum multiplied by the appropriate number of years, would reasonably represent the necessary value of the Fund. 'This sum,' they added, 'will be divided among the owners in accordance with the development value of their various holdings.' Such a distribution, however, would only provide, as the Committee made clear, a fraction of the present worth of each holding. This unfairness impressed even its authors, and drove them to propose also a 'Supplemental Fund' to reduce the losses of the owners of land dead-ripe for development. Their awareness of the weakness of their argument is further disclosed where they depicted payment for purchases by the community as an act of grace. 'The question whether or not . . . compensation should be paid in respect of the imposition of the restriction on development is a matter of policy on which it is not for us to express an opinion. We propose, however, to assume that fair compensation will be paid. This involves that the sum to be paid should represent the fair value to the purchaser of the development rights as a whole.' This is a new definition of 'fair value,' which few men of business are likely to accept.

The inadequate regard of the Committee for the individual owner in respect of the valuation of development rights is also disclosed by the minority report. The majority recommended that 'no account shall be taken of any increased value . . . arising from the actual or possible demands for the land or other land by any Government Department, local or public authority, or any statutory undertaker. . . .' The minority report points out that the provision of houses having to a great extent become uneconomic, the greater part of the demand for sites, raising in Scotland to about 75 per cent. of the whole, comes now from public authorities. If only 25 per cent. of the demand is to be used for calculating the amount of compensation to be paid for development rights, this can in fairness be divided only over 25 per cent. of undeveloped land available. To apply, as does the majority report, a general Compensation Fund so calculated to the total undeveloped area available for meeting the large public demand as well as the small private demand produces, as the minority report points out, 'a ridiculous result.' 'It is one thing,' runs the

minority report, 'to say that the State can acquire land compulsorily and that private ownership carries with it the duty of surrendering land to the community when the needs of the community require it, but surely it does not follow that the owner is not to get a fair price for it?'

The Committee appear to have been lured into their unhappy position regarding development rights by a desire to solve positively the third problem put to them—the possibility of stabilising the value of land needed for development. For this purpose they adopted a theory of a national quantum of potential development. 'Development values as a whole,' ran the report, 'are dependent on the economic factors that determine the quantum of development of various types required throughout the country, and as planning does not reduce this quantum it does not destroy land values but merely redistributes them over a different area. Planning control may reduce the value of a particular piece of land, but over the country as a whole there is no loss.' It is improbable that this theory is completely true anywhere. In so far as it applies, its effects are likely to be local, and to decrease as the area increases. If, in some developing street, a new shop is desired, and the optimum site cannot be made available, it is probable that, subject to considerable delay and extra expense, another adequate site will be forthcoming. And so the quantum theory might be said to apply. If, however, a developer wishes in some carefully chosen place to start an hotel or to develop a building estate, and is prevented from so doing by the Authority, there is no reason why he or any other person should proceed in another part of the country to attempt a similar development. Many local and personal factors affect such schemes. The argument is even stronger in the case of factories and shops. For a manufacturer, or wholesaler, a site has to be related to the position of raw materials and markets, transport facilities, and the availability of suitable labour. A potential retailer has to consider the extent and kind of demand, and the shops already operating. These and other factors form a complex local problem for the developer, and in no two places are they likely to be closely similar. It has also to be remembered that modern demand is largely created by the enterprise of the manufacturer,

backed by the individual initiative of the scientists, artists, and salesmen, whom he employs. Such organisation among living persons has innumerable living connections, which cannot be severed and reunited without great cost and risk of loss. The quantum theory of the Committee relies too much on public demand, assuming that, if development is pruned back in one place, it must sprout somewhere else. Animals, however, except the lowest forms, do not react to mechanical manipulation in the same way as plants. It seems more probable that, each time a potential developer is put out of action, this amount of national energy will be lost, at least for a time, and in many cases for good.

This criticism of the Committee's recommendation is not to argue against planning. We can accept the desirability of national planning without being misled into a belief that it can be other than a slow and expensive reform for the public good. In effect, we are to make illegal what hitherto has been legal. While owners cannot expect compensation for compliance with established laws, they can expect, and ought to be given, full compensation when, for public convenience, a change in the law suddenly deprives them of rights or property, the previous enjoyment of which has been generally accepted as proper.

The Committee's constructive alternative for the collection of betterment is that, when the ordinary quinquennial valuations of urban hereditaments are made, valuations of the sites, as actually developed, should also be made, and that these should be the 'datum annual site values.' Five years later, and quinquennially thereafter, if any increase is shown in the annual value of a site as compared with the datum value, the State should take as a levy some agreed proportion of the increased value, regardless of the probable causes of this betterment. The recommendation is opposed in a minority report on the grounds that it is too late; that it would be expensive to administer, involving numerous appeals; that it works only one way in collecting betterment for the State, while ignoring possible worsenment for owners; that it might be difficult to recover the levy from the right person; and that the financial results might well be disappointing.

As the minority report admits, however, 'the theory of the scheme is ingenious and probably is, in all the existing circumstances, as effective as can be suggested to meet the end in view.' It also finds support in the supplementary recommendation of five members of the Scott Committee for declared values for all real property, apportioned between sites and buildings. And it avoids an objection to previous proposals for taxing sites, by restricting the valuation of a site to its actual use, without regard to other possible uses. The merit of this reasonable recommendation seems, therefore, to depend on whether or not the cost of the scheme would be justified by the fair share of betterment resulting for the State, assuming fairness to apply equally to both parties.

The Committees approached by stages their fourth point of reference—powers desirable for land purchase by the State. In the case of land now undeveloped, but the development rights of which the State would already have acquired, they suggested no change until its development became desirable. Then 'purchase by the State of the land itself if and when required for approved development whether for public purposes or for private purposes' and in the latter case 'the leasing of the such land by the State to the person or body undertaking the development.' If, at this final stage of nationalisation, the owner were to receive for his interest the same kind of value, fair to the purchaser, which the Committee suggested for the first stage, the total expropriation cost to him promises to be high. Precautions to secure valuations fair to both parties are clearly necessary. For, if once the State acquires the right of development, there can be no strong reason, when the time for development arrives, for preserving an owner unable to continue his 'undeveloped' user.

Regarding 'the urgent task of reconstructing war-damaged areas, and the almost equally urgent task of securing the redevelopment of obsolete and unsatisfactory areas,' there is likely to be general agreement with the Committee's opinion that 'it is essential . . . to cut through the tangle of separate ownerships and boundary lines and make the whole of the land in the area immediately available for comprehensive replanning as a single unit'; and there should be corresponding support

for their recommendation that 'for the purpose of securing necessary redevelopment the planning authority should be given the power to purchase the whole of such areas.'

In order to accelerate planning in other areas, the Committee recommended for the planning authority compulsory powers for the purchase of land required for adjusting boundaries, or for reinstating persons displaced by planning, or for purposes of planning; that such purchases should be possible before a planning scheme is in operation, and without a 'qualification that the land is expected to be required for a defined purpose within a specified period of time.' These reasonable proposals are not, however, accompanied by equally reasonable suggestions regarding the procedure for purchase. The recommendations are 'that there should be no public inquiry in any case unless the Central Planning Authority . . . should . . . think it desirable'; and that 'a similar rule should apply in regard to the service of individual notices.' In all such purchases, it is important to obtain first-hand evidence of the present uses of the land from those who own or use it. Any fair-minded Authority would wish to weigh such evidence against that favourable to the change. The speed of action reasonably recommended by the Committee in the case of reconstruction areas, where the problem of empty or derelict sites is one of bricks and mortar, is out of place in other planning changes, where the homes and lives of the present owners and occupiers are involved.

Closely connected with powers of State purchase is a recommendation 'that there shall be power to place a "life" on "non-conforming" buildings and uses with a view to securing conformity without compensation at the expiration of that "life".' This proposal would remove the serious obstacle to planning, which at present exists in an owner's almost unqualified right, unless compensation is paid, to maintain and replace existing buildings, notwithstanding that they are out of conformity with a planning scheme. Here again the Committee's theory is reasonable, but it requires to be accompanied by procedure which will make each 'life' long enough to protect the owner from loss. Similarly, there is no justification for limiting to ten years, as the Committee suggested, the life of buildings fit for habitation but 'not in

accordance with the standards applied to new buildings for similar purposes in a similar district.' Each building should be valued at the price fair to both parties at the date when, for the community's benefit, the owner is to lose the use of it.

The three reports cover the land situation comprehensively, and combine to disclose clearly the essence of the planning problem. It is to allot to the State and to private enterprise their appropriate shares in a more complete and enlightened system of land management for the general well-being; and to adjust for mutual benefit urban and rural interests. The Barlow Commission and the Scott Committee, which examined especially the present uses of urban and rural land, were less critical of private enterprise and less confident about State management than was the Uthwatt Committee. The recommendations of the latter were more in the form of special pleading for swift and paternal action by the State, at minimum cost to the public. They failed to outline a balanced self-management policy suited to a vigorous, independently-minded democracy. Statesmanship requires that, before there is any unnecessary transfer of responsibility and power from individuals to the State, the latter shall put to the best use its existing powers, and fill the many gaps in our national organisation which only the State can fill. The reports make clear the ample scope for such State action, both centrally and locally. Until these self-improvements by the State have been effected, it will be wise to postpone the consideration of land nationalisation, for which the Barlow Commission did not ask, which the Scott Committee did not want, and which the Uthwatt Committee could recommend only on terms vitiated by their one-sidedness.

The Government has already implemented the only step in planning, on which agreement is general, by establishing a central planning authority. It is a happy augury for the plans that the Minister, who is to control them, has been Minister of Agriculture, and so is qualified to adjust the urgent needs of the rural minority with the higher, and still to be improved, standards of the urban majority. The next moves towards the new planning which appear to be indicated, are that the 'Industrial Development Board,' recommended by the Barlow Com-

mission, should make specific proposals for 'encouraging' or 'discouraging' industrial development in various areas; and that a rural survey be made of especially fertile lands, which should, if possible, be reserved for agriculture. The towns, or 'built up areas,' could then revise their boundaries, remodel their plans, and begin the redevelopment of 'reconstruction areas.' This definition of the towns would also make clear what exactly are the 'undeveloped areas.*' Then, acting in regions of convenient size, the urban centres of supply of water, electricity, and other such essential services could plan to serve between them all the adjoining undeveloped areas. It would be an active and continuous function of the Central Planning Authority to coordinate the different regional organisations of these various services with the local authorities concerned, so that, without gaps or overlapping, the best practicable conditions of life are economically provided for the whole population. Municipal and private enterprises, where functioning well now, would be left to continue doing so. In every case, time would show which, if either, is the better. Given a comprehensive central policy adapted for change with changes of conditions, wise control, and efficient persons generously entrusted with responsibility for local action, and it will probably matter little if undertakings are State or municipal in some places and privately-owned in others. The war has demonstrated the merits of this method in the successful cooperation secured by the Ministries of Food and Agriculture. Both Ministries in consultation have evolved complete policies, have issued clear instructions to the local executive bodies, and then have trusted these to interpret the policy intelligently for

* Scattered about the 'undeveloped' areas will be country houses and other buildings forming islands of 'developed' property. The Committee necessarily recognised such 'land developed by reason of the erection thereon of a substantial building of any kind.' In an attempt to give artificial uniformity to buildings widely varying in size and character, the Committee proposed to classify as 'developed' not more than one acre in any one case. Fortunately, as has been pointed out (Memorandum on the Uthwatt Report by the Oxford Bursars' Committee), a more practical definition is already provided in the Settled Land Act, where a mansion house is defined as 'a house with not more than twenty acres of grounds usually occupied therewith.' The use of this definition will avoid the absurdity of regarding one part of the site of a building and its curtilage as 'developed' and another part as 'undeveloped.'

the public good. This elastic system, stimulated by personal touch between leaders and the led, has made the war-time feeding of the nation an achievement of which it can be proud. If similar clear thinking at the centre and freedom of local action can be applied to future planning, the country should secure the improved land management, for which it rightly asks, without the waste of time and money characteristic of so much official procedure, or the State speculation and social disturbance inseparable, under present conditions, from land nationalisation.

RONALD HART-SYNNOT.

Art. 3.—WHERE ARISTOCRACY HAS GOVERNED.

AT all ages of civilisation through Europe, and not only Europe but Asia, and now the Americas, we have seen a difference of class: the richer and the poorer—the upper, the middle, and the lower. Governments and forms of government have changed; reforms have come by revolution and evolution; but in a short time the difference has again been marked. Yet once again, after the lower classes in every part of the world have been successful for many years in asserting their rights, we find the deluge of a second war obliterating the terraces of society. Those who had money forfeit it in taxation more extortionate than any known in history, privileges and deference are withheld, servants go, food is restricted, movement curtailed, and there is little left to the upper classes except a memory, a tradition of manners, sport or reading, the finish of voice and words, of knowledge of what they share with one another, a burden of closed rooms, and a weight of silver in the cupboards or bank. They have been overcome by forces from two opposed directions: the one, new, despotic, organised, violent, extreme example of the modern totalitarian state; the other loose, parliamentary, gradual, talking of liberty and democracy. Between the rubbing of these two opposing forces in the pressure of war, we are in the full course—as Sir William Beveridge and Sir Walter Monckton remind us—of a sweeping revolution.

The deluge sweeps us to what? Since we cannot answer that, it is well to pause for a moment and to consider this endangered class: What were its origins? How was it constituted? What was its character? What did it do? Why has it fallen into such a predicament? And, finally, Can we do without it?

A first glance shows us that since the beginning—apart from lower and middle and even upper middle classes—there have always been two strata of an upper class: in the first the grand seigneur, or major baron, the great hereditary peer, with land, wealth, privilege, rank, and powerful connections; and, secondly, the fonctionnaire, the professional man, the successful business man, the squire or knight, who formed a subsidiary upper class, merging into and in certain phases disputing the power of the other.

Through the centuries, and up to now, these upper classes have been marked by power and finesse. Their power was so great, their social privileges so desirable, their superiority so little questioned, that those desiring to rise aimed at being accepted by them, not at ousting them. If we look at these upper classes as epochs inaugurating a new system, we see them obtaining first administrative power then property as the satellites of a central master. So they were in the age of Alexander, of Augustus, and as Mr Christopher Dawson has shown us in the time of Charlemagne; England sees them in the same guise in the reigns of William the Conqueror, of Henry VIII, of Elizabeth, of Charles II, of George I, even of Victoria, and so on to now.

The class so set up takes on a tradition. It is immensely modified by the land. The solid interests of the country, the type around them, the savourous plentiful food, the ale, the whisky and the wine, the country sports—hunting, fishing, shooting—nourished the body, set the temper, and made character robust. People so seasoned could bear government on broad shoulders. But dignity was there, and the habit of command learnt from the cradle. And with dignity went the luxury of space, and with the space a power of choice that meant elegant taste. They had an instinct for good things and even for the best things. The standard of their life was, as we suggested, too high to dispute.

The mere fact that this was so made them receptive to success attained by any other. Patrons of talent at one period, in another they accepted it into their household and brotherhood. Aristocracy, especially in England, was so elastic, and had so wide a range of tastes, that it could welcome the varieties of success. And it provided a not unworthy goal for ambition.

For in good society there was everything: taste, knowledge, sport, luxury; the flavour was distilled and concentrated in lunches and dinners in London and in week-ends in the country. In these a surprising amount of the direction of the country was carried on. When people are in the same house even for a night or two they get to know one another; cordiality mellows to friendship. And no art of breeding is more precious than that by which courtesy gives to a whole circle the ease and warmth of friendship. A guest arriving for one of these short visits to country houses would probably arrive by car in time for tea, a game, or a walk through woods and garden. He would enjoy the lawns, the trees, the terraces, the herbaceous borders. While footmen or valet unpacked his clothes, he would come in for tea or drinks to a house nobly built, stored with new and old books, and on the walls some old, perhaps some modern, masters. After his bath, he would come down to meet his fellow guests in library or drawing-room. If an Ambassador were present, he would until the war have been wearing a white tie; formality abandoned, but precedence not ignored, women and men would drift towards the dining-table; the house would bring forward its specialities, say its *crème de champignons*, its *mousse-de-Jambon* or Turkey cream, its cured ham and Cumberland sauce, while a choice of red and white wines added colour, and champagne a sparkle, to the glitter of candles on silver and gold plate; after sweets and savoury, the table would be cleared for the port and dessert, which in their turn led on to liqueurs, brandy, and coffee. In the atmosphere of these *agréments*, men and women would exchange views, stories, memories, information until, after the departure of the ladies, the host walking to the other end of the table placed himself with his more distinguished guests. The time was now ripe for important matters to be broached; and much at this time was done towards

smoothing or settling difficulties or working out new moves in the way that can be done only by geniality and warmth of heart. Conversation could continue till a late hour, either formally or informally, in the drawing-room, for those who preferred it to bridge or billiards. So much was already done on the Saturday, perhaps even the Friday evening. There was a day, or perhaps two days to follow. Few guests would appear for breakfast; but before lunch time, in their enviable surroundings—amused often by tennis, or in other seasons by hunting, shooting, or a round of golf, and younger people drifted to a swim in the bathing pool in summer days—the party would pursue its appointed course in the same amplitude of benevolence, dignity, and good cheer, the same spacious, soothing, perhaps inspiring surroundings, the same excellence of cellar and cuisine, until it scattered on the Monday morning, and most of it returned by train or car to London, refreshed, informed, and toned. There at times, at receptions, lunches, and dinners, in an atmosphere of more formality, and on official occasions with the wearing of uniform and decorations, society gravitated toward the court, and its receptions, the luncheon or dinner, the levée, the drawing-room, and, above all, for the general rendezvous of the people who counted, at the Buckingham Palace Garden Party.

In all these there were in various proportions similar social ingredients: ancient families with or without great possessions, others drawn into the circle of the central society, the important party men, the senior members of the Services, including the Civil Service and in that Diplomacy, and with these the men foremost in professional life, law, medicine, learning, science, and the arts, painting, architecture, sculpture, music—in a word those who led the life of Britain, controlled or developed the Empire, captained the interlocking complexities of business, or were busy with foreign countries. For all careers were open to talent; and what talent most prized was to be taken into the fellowship of privilege which kept a secret from the past and had enjoyed peculiar advantages in youth. Thus personal excellence found itself always moving in association with history, and it was bettered by meeting with tradition.

Such socially was the structure of the upper class in

Britain, and it was a thing into which boys grew. Taken early from their nurseries, they were trained in their preparatory schools till, at thirteen, they went to one of the historic institutions which came down from the Middle Ages. In these Eton occupied a central place. Architecture, river, fields, trees, treasures, books, and portraits suited the free training of this royal foundation nestling under Windsor; specialists to teach, a large choice of taste and time, a rivalry on the river or the fields not to mention the Wall Game and Eton fives trained boys to admire skill, to fit themselves to one another, to form friendships, and to prepare for government. It was a world in itself, where the captain of the eleven felt that the world was at his feet till the years disclosed that in an Empire there were still other opportunities of greatness.

Beyond the public school were Sandhurst, Woolwich, and the Universities. And these, too, were fine opportunities of adventure among masterpieces in the intervals of sport and social life. To a wider circle and maturer minds, less centred in athletics, they taught what Eton taught: the art of living with others, and the knack of government. Dignity, space, freedom within the bounds of a loose order combined to spread the secret none can utter; a college enabled a couple of hundred young men to train their minds in an amplitude very like that of a country house. The meals were less sumptuous, the service less *stylé*, but the social opportunities were richer both in things of sport and of the mind, and the gardens and architecture better than all but the best of country houses. This too, then, was a training for gentlemen, for men who could use leisure to perfect life. Efficiency sat lightly on this class; but for the most part it was there, combined with an Hellenic grace. Healthy, easy, faithful both to tradition and *décor*, such were the upper class of England; and such as had inherited enough capacity to use their privileges and power, or had attained to eminence in their careers joined in the central society which centred round the court, which was the *élite* of the capital, which moulded Britain and in the last resort governed the Empire.

None has painted its splendours with more enthusiasm, none has expressed a franker pleasure in the places and

palaces in which it lived than the present chief of the Conservative Party, Mr Churchill.

What was peculiar to Britain, and endowed her with a special strength, were two facts : first that the governing class governed not merely in positions of power, but enjoyed a place in the Constitution through the fact that eminence, whether by heritage or personal gifts, tended to find a place in the House of Lords ; secondly, and not less peculiar, was the fact that in the House of Lords, in the social order, in the institutions of learning, one felt a tradition which went back to the time when much of the power and prestige were in the hands of the clergy ; there was still, with all its implications, in the constitution of the State an established Church.

It reminded one how much of the fabric of an earlier England was religious. Socially and spiritually the tradition of England is hierarchical. The Anglo-Saxons had a common law and crude pagan background, the sort of thing the cruder Nazis have been reviving to-day. What gave England its stamp was first the Roman administration, and then the Roman Church, especially in the form of the Great Benedictine order which with its reading of the Bible, its ordered worship, its mental activity, including architecture and the arts, its agriculture, its choirs and schools, formed England's educated class to the standard which has been cherished till our own day.

In the Constitution this tradition leaves its impress certainly on the House of Commons, and the Monarchy itself, but its shrine is the House of Lords.

Echoing back to the Witenagemot of the Anglo-Saxon Kings, the Normans inaugurated the great Council of the leading men of the realm : Archbishops, Bishops and Abbots, Earls, Thegns and Knights, who gathered round the King at certain festivals, at Westminster, Winchester, or Gloucester. To these councils the greater came by personal summons from the Crown ; the lesser through the Sheriffs of their counties. Through the influence of Simon de Montfort, in the thirteenth century, this Council became a Parliament. In 1295 it numbered 138 : 7 Earls, 41 Barons, 20 Bishops, 3 provincials of religious orders and 67 Abbots. In 1307 the spiritual peers were only 76 against the lay 80 ; in 1327, 45 against 86. As yet neither

Dukes, Marquises, nor Viscounts were known. The first Duke was the Black Prince, nominated Duke of Cornwall, in 1377 : the first Marquess dates from 1386, the first Viscount from the reign of Henry VI.

The Lords had power over taxation through the dues they voted to the Crown. They took the chief part in making laws. They were also a court of appeal.

Through the Middle Ages the House did not increase in number. At the accession of Henry VIII, they were 48 clergy and 36 laymen.

Such was the state of affairs when the dissolution of the monasteries revolutionised society. The Church ceased to control the economic system ; capitalism arose, and business men rose to power. By 1603 the spiritual peers were reduced to 26 ; the laymen were already 80. In 1625 they were 100, in 1761, 200, in 1837, 400, in 1901, 700 ; they are now close to 800, the Bishops reduced from 26 to 24.

Cromwell's Commonwealth had both abolished and revived the House of Lords ; it was after the Restoration in 1660, that the oligarchical system reached its zenith. A small knot of peers not only governed through the House of Lords, but also nominated the House of Commons. In 1816 out of 658 members of the House of Commons, 487 were nominees. It was not until 1832 that the peers began to lose control ; the business men to gain it. By that time Britain was so far industrialised that a new system ruled. In France a portion of the aristocracy had been killed by one machine, the guillotine ; in Britain no aristocrat was touched, but the robes and function were slowly torn from one after another by being entangled in the wheels of many machines.

The aristocratic system was a feudal system and the feudal system was one of landed estates with all that those implied. In a hierarchy of function this governing class, which did so many things, did not so easily take to business ; it viewed its task as something above that, and its taste was certainly different. The problem of the seigniorial class since the French revolution has been how to cope with the fact that the wealth of the country has been less and less in land, and what land produces, and more and more in commerce and industry. How is the peer, how is the bishop, how are the cultured classes as

a whole to deal with manufacture and trade? That problem presses harder and harder on a world where machines do more and more, even in the fields themselves, and where even the market gardener must have his motor. Should the peer or should he not be a business man? Can he find in machines what he found in nature and sport? Or is it possible that he can best serve the State by not surrendering wholly either to business or machines?

Compromise is the essence of the British genius, and in it, no doubt, is the answer to these questions. Peers never preferred the arrow to gunpowder, and if barbarian or wild life are to be made subservient, there is no need to fling away the weapons science offers. Science takes its place in the world of culture; science cannot be ignored, and neither can invention. In changing England, they have affected the peers, and peers retain their wealth, and therefore their power, only in so far as they, by fortune or design, have been able to compromise with the life of a modern town. Sometimes, without much effort, they have been enriched by the growth of a town; at other times, coal and minerals on their estates have helped, sometimes marriages, occasionally other enterprise; and lastly money, generally through politics, has been steadily finding its way into the House of Lords for more than a hundred years.

The powerful men who rose by meeting a need of an industrialised and expanding business were by no means out of place in the peerage, even if they came from the beerage, or owed their elevation to the contribution of 150,000*l.* to the funds of their party. They oiled the machine of government in Britain. They had earned their promotion by service and success, like a bishop, an administrator, or a general. Power itself educated them, and the country, as we have said, was splendidly served by the fact that these new men were immediately tried and disciplined by the standard of the House of Lords, by the principle of *noblesse oblige*, and by the tradition of an upright aristocracy among and for the people under whom they found themselves. Society did for them what was done for their sons in schools.

In actual function, the House of Lords is less an hereditary chamber than a senate where men, whose

experience, often enhanced by inherited advantages, is gained from politics or from service in their professions, can discuss and decide affairs not only with special knowledge but with the wisdom and virtue of an empire's traditional leadership. There is no better comment on current things than Hansards record of their debates. And they are not merely a Consultary Council; important measures can be initiated in the House of Lords. Their main business, however, is still, as it was eighty and a hundred years ago, to revise the hurried legislation of the House of Commons; among them one can always form a committee of experts, and they have the right to send a bill back twice to the House of Commons in a revised form.

On Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, the House of Lords, or what is virtually a legal committee of it, meets at 10.30, and sits till 4 as the Supreme Court of Appeal. This Court is composed of the Lord Chancellor and four Lords of Appeal, and gives a more expert judgment and interpretation of the law than is to be found in any other Court for the simple reason that the most eminent and experienced justices are in the House of Lords. Such a procedure reminds that equivalent committees advise and function admirably on other subjects; and, indeed, the particular discussions in the House of Lords, for the same reason, are certain to produce the judgments of the most distinguished experts. If on a Tuesday the Navy is being discussed, on Wednesday agriculture, on a Thursday housing, each day will produce its own experts, whom public opinion as well as personal interest oblige to attend.

The peace time procedure allows the Lord Chancellor a quarter of an hour's interval after his judicial work, for the House of Lords meets at 4.15. A new peer may enter in a scarlet-robed procession and, kneeling, hand to the Lord Chancellor his writ of summons from the King. If not, the Clerk of the Parliament in white wig and black gown reads the order of the day. A bill may receive the Royal Assent through a legal commission of the Lord Chancellor and two other peers of the Privy Council; else there will be the normal debate; and there may be a vote. But whatever the work may be, the House of Lords is still what it was in the beginning: a witenage-

mot, a council of powerful and able men, ripened in experience.

Does one, then, say that this applies to the 784 members of the house; are none of them incompetent or inexperienced; are none of them what Mr Lloyd George called back-woodsmen? Some of them certainly are; but a man who is incompetent dare not waste the time of experts in debate and seldom appears even to vote. The actual work of the house is done by the men of ability who attend. There are many other peers who give up their leisure to their estates, and to leadership in their counties, performing an important work the better for the tradition and prestige of their rank, but not affecting the senatorial work of their House in Parliament.

Though in practice the present scheme works well enough, it is formally unreal. Formally, the House of Lords can still delay a bill other than a money bill. Formally, the House of Lords is still open to some hundreds of men on no qualification but heredity. Nature does not guarantee that a family can hand on ability from eldest son to eldest son. Appearance should have a more logical relation to reality; the world even in England sometimes mistakes it for reality. The House of Lords, therefore, some ten years ago busied itself in projects for its own reform. Lord Salisbury brought forward a scheme of which the Lords themselves passed the Second Reading in 1933. Besides Peers of the Blood Royal, 5 Bishops, and Law Lords nominated as at present, the House as reformed was to consist of 300 members, 150 elected by peers, 150 either elected by county councils or nominated by the Crown. The Bill left this open, in the hope that it would have a better chance in the Commons.

The defect of the scheme was its compromise between heredity and the vote. Neither guarantees either efficiency or wisdom. No life peerage should be granted except on unimpeachable grounds of personal distinction. Nor should even an hereditary peer receive a writ of summons until his right to it is proved. The grounds would be, say, seven years' service in the House of Commons or on a borough or county council, or on a board of some great company; or a certain seniority in one of the Services: naval, aerial, military, or civil, including diplomacy; or contributions to the arts, learning and

literature, or to science and invention, or in the patronage and encouragement of these. Privilege unproved is accused of usurpation ; but if compromise is again to guide us, we should not yet ignore that class which, until a century ago, controlled the government of a Great Britain which, as Mr Arthur Bryant has shown in 'English Saga,' was in many ways happier, healthier, and more skilful than this great business country which has grown up for the last hundred years on the combination of democracy with *laissez-faire*.

The word democracy leads us to another consideration. As Professor Karl Mannheim has shown us, in the days when rifles were the principal weapons of war, every shooter counted ; armed force depended on individual men. That day has passed. Invention, no longer contented with the chassepot or the schneider, has prepared for war the bomb, the tank, the landmine ; in the air the bomber and the fighter ; in the sea the depth charge. This is but one aspect of the new technique which concentrates power in the hand of organisers. The censorship and the controlled wireless manufacture opinion as monotonously and as thoroughly as arms are manufactured. Governments are organised in terms of mass production ; and since this gives them power to make war and therefore to threaten it, they have forced much of the same technique on systems which vaunted themselves to be democratic. Nor is even this the end of the problem. The welfare of the people, as Mr Churchill insisted in 'Thoughts and Adventures,' depends upon a scientific organisation of production and markets ; it needs a Council of economic experts ; it cannot be settled by the mere democratic expedient of counting noses.

The enormous increase of output through machinery has been accompanied all over Europe by dictatorships based on function and organisation. Professor James Burnham of the University of New York has traced this power in his arresting book, 'The Managerial Revolution.' Few will dispute its contentions that everywhere what Mussolini called 'pluto-democracy' is giving way to an expert control where the bureaucrat and the 'technocrat' (as America calls him) combine to settle the dominant issue of economics and therefore of life. This system,

which is very different from the Marxian Socialism of a classless society, based on the products of the proletariat, explains the capacity of Russia to organise and resist in war. It is the means by which the 'fascist' powers have organised Europe, dealt with unemployment, and also shown cohesiveness. And the war has forced it on the English-speaking world. It is the New Deal, the new form of controlled economics, of planning which is now the most significant element in government. With commanding clearness, Professor Burnham sets out the facts of this universal revolution.

Before it the old forms of wealth crumble. Against it, democracy is meaningless. But Britain will still need to coordinate with her traditions, her taste for freedom, her respect for justice, and her spiritual ideals. All this points back to a new need of leadership and counsel in government, a choice of men trained and skilled by the interplay of tradition and experience. No worker prefers the ruthless efficiency of a self-made manager to the manners and tradition of a gentleman.

For the crisis that we have to face in the future will depend on two new bases. The war will have so far weakened the system of democracy which, during its long struggle, war is compelled to abrogate, that in the resulting strain of poverty, the need of a coordinating unified scientific control with a set policy and purpose will be the first necessity of the nation's life. The war has shown that this cohesive purpose will be even more necessary in foreign policy. Both of these will weaken the party system and change the nature of the House of Commons. And the more the State is unified and organised, the more will the House of Commons cede its power to the permanent government, to the officials both civil and military. For even here our economy has been forced into subjection to a military purpose, because it was compelled to fight this same organised power of war-like purpose in Germany. But if this bureaucracy is not to be all powerful, in a new and sinister national socialism, then it can be guided and disciplined only by experts and a living tradition. Both of these are already found in the House of Lords. Both of these are the heritage of that combination of achieved standards with personal enterprise and experience which mark those who attend it. But we have seen that it

stands for and enshrines other values. Its dignity is not merely that of experience and rank. Its counsel contains a strong ingredient of law ; and if there is one principle rather than another to which we must return, it is the sense of law and justice, justice between classes, justice between nations. For in both of these Britain lagged. Neither in the elimination of slums, nor the order of a just economy, nor in wise and enterprising diplomacy had she risen to her opportunities. All this suggests that she had too long ignored the principles so strongly stressed in the original House of Lords, the place occupied by the representatives of the Church.

In the first place, those Bishops and Abbots who, at the end as at the beginning of the Middle Ages, held the majority were life peers as the Bishops are still. There can be no doubt that the idea that these men were selected for their ability as spiritual leaders, and not by the property on which to found family dignity, is one which needs emphasising to-day. Bagehot recalls that Lord Palmerston brought forward a measure for creating life peers, and so reforming the House. The Crown endorsed the measure. Party considerations, however, persuaded the peers themselves to vote against the reform which would have been a cogent reinforcement of the principle of their order. 'But,' wrote Bagehot, 'if the doors are shut against genius that cannot found a family and ability which has not five thousand a year, so its power will be less year by year and at last be gone.' These words were published three-quarters of a century ago, and yet they have not been acted on. They clamour for consideration to-day. The spiritual leaders of to-day are not all Bishops ; they are not all members of the Church of England ; they are not all clerics of any denomination whatsoever. They represent the power of true culture and governance. They may be our British equivalent of the *Académie Française* ; and even that, though it honoured the philosopher, the historian, and the critic, found no place for the thinker who was a scientist. But we need in our senate not merely peers but seers ; we need Sages who will be able to take amends for the blindness past years have shown both in providing for the masses ; and in the lack of policy in foreign affairs, men who have information as well as energy of thought

and elevation of view, to ride the deluge of the present cataclysm.

Who can say that we find such men in the House of Commons? Who would pretend that it is such men who can best appeal to the selfishness, the captiousness, the ignorance or the wearied indifference of universal suffrage? The voters themselves are cynical about a democracy where newspapers are controlled by unknown interests, where the governments which withhold information are finally swayed to fatal decisions by an opinion they omitted to educate. And now in the extreme of crisis why trust the House of Commons, whose rise coincided with that of the capitalist system now collapsing, rather than the House of Lords, which represents the feudal elements of function both traditional and personal, of expert experience and of the thought and faculties which bind Britain both to the Universal Church and the gifts of heaven?

This element of the constitution is ignored even more than the Crown. Neither newspapers, nor politicians, nor the agents of propaganda ever discuss it. Nor do even its own members make clear what it is doing. Yet Britain may rejoice that she has in it a safeguard and an organ which no other country enjoys; for, in a period of revolution, it retains the qualities which may give to the new economy the wealth and elevation of a standard which has come down the centuries to preserve an Empire, and shine as a beacon to a tormented starving and uncertain Europe.

Lord Salisbury is right: we need conscious, recognised, and harnessed strength in the House of Lords; even as it functions now it offers something which neither Crown nor Empire can do without. But undoubtedly it should be reformed: for the present time has seen the weaknesses of democracy. But it also feels there is injustice where privileges are not guaranteed by proved personal worth and function, such as can tide the deluge.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

Art. 4.—BRITISH WAR AIMS, 1914-19.

Now that the Allies have passed to the offensive and our ultimate victory seems to be assured, the demand for a fuller exposition of our war aims may be expected to grow. The Atlantic Charter is an excellent outline, but it will need to be filled in. Whether and at what point a detailed declaration should be made is a matter for the Allied Governments. Though it is often argued that the military situation must become clearer before a step of such far-reaching importance is taken, it is certainly not too soon for unofficial bodies and private citizens to begin to work out an acceptable settlement. In approaching this difficult task it is of interest to recall the evolution of our programme during the First World War and to inquire how far it was carried out in the treaties of peace.

Our reasons for joining in the conflict were explained by Grey in his historic speech of Aug. 3, 1914, and the objectives were authoritatively stated by the Prime Minister in two notable speeches. During the Franco-German War of 1870 Gladstone had said that the greatest triumph of our time would be the enthronement of the idea of public right as a governing idea of European policy. That, declared Asquith at Dublin on Sept. 25, 1914, was the best definition of Britain's ultimate policy. The idea of public right meant the substitution for force, for the nourishing of competing ambition, for the groupings of alliances, for a precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership based upon the recognition of equal rights, established and enforced by common will. On Nov. 9, 1914, at the Guildhall banquet, the Prime Minister was more precise. 'We shall never sheathe the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed on an unassailable foundation, and until the military dominion of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.' From what was called the Guildhall declaration Britain never departed, and no attempt was made to fill in the outlines for nearly two years.

During this long interval four events occurred which were to necessitate further and fuller declarations. The

first was the entry of Turkey into the ranks of the Central Powers. The second was the use made by Germany of her colonies as bases for attack on the British Empire and its lines of communication, and the resulting need for considerable military operations by Dominion, Indian, and Colonial troops. The third was the belligerence of Italy in May 1915, which had to be purchased in the Treaty of London by the recognition of her claim to coveted territory on the east side of the Adriatic. The fourth was the ever-increasing extent of the devastations in France, which rendered reparation by the invader a primary war aim.

On Oct. 11, 1916, Asquith declared that the aims of the Allies were not selfish nor vindictive, but they required adequate reparation for the past and adequate security for the future. Grey's address to the Foreign Press Association on Oct. 23, 1916, carried the definition of war aims a stage further. 'For years before the war we were living under the deepening shadow of Prussian militarism extending itself over the whole of Germany and then extending itself over the whole Continent. There must be no end to this war except a peace which is going to ensure that the nations of Europe live in the future free from the shadow of the great anarchist. A neutral has asked me what neutrals can do. The best thing is to work upon opinion for such an agreement between nations as will prevent a war like this happening again. If they had been united in such an agreement and prompt and resolute to insist in July 1914, that the dispute must be referred to a conference or to the Hague, and that the Belgian Treaty must be observed there would have been no war.' Though Grey left office a few weeks later when Asquith was followed as Premier by Lloyd George, the idea of creating international machinery for the prevention of war was kept continually in mind, and the first scheme of a League of Nations was worked out by the Phillimore Committee.

After more than two years of indecisive struggle Germany inaugurated an exchange of views between the belligerents which continued almost without interruption till the end. On Dec. 12, 1916, Bethmann Hollweg transmitted a note suggesting negotiations. The latest events, he declared, proved that the resistance of the Central Powers was unbreakable, but they did not seek

to crush or annihilate their enemies. They felt sure that the propositions which they would bring forward would serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace. The first reply came from Britain's new Prime Minister. To enter into a conference without any knowledge of Germany's proposals would be dangerous. Before such an invitation could be considered it was necessary to know that Germany was prepared to accede to the only terms on which peace could be obtained and maintained—complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantees. After individual rejoinders, the Allies on Dec. 30, 1916, sent a collective refusal of the invitation which they described as empty and insincere. 'Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible till they have secured reparation of violated rights, recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small states, and a settlement calculated to end forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations.'

In this first exchange neither side had put their cards on the table. But at almost the same moment, on Dec. 18, 1916, President Wilson invited the belligerents to announce the terms on which they believed the war might be ended. The Allies replied on Jan. 10, 1917, in the first detailed statement of their aims. They were the restoration and compensation of Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro; the evacuation and compensation of France, Russia, and Roumania; the reorganisation of Europe by a regime based on respect for nationalities, the right to full security, liberty of economic development, territorial conventions and international settlements guaranteeing frontiers against aggression; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the liberation of the populations subject to the Ottoman Empire and the expulsion from Europe of that Empire as alien to Western civilisation. The Tsar's intentions for Poland had been indicated in his manifesto to his armies. The Allies desired to defend Europe against the covetous brutality of Prussian militarism, but the extermination and political disappearance of the German peoples had never formed part of their designs. The reference to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe was

plain enough, but the attitude to the Austro-Hungarian empire was vague. The liberation of Italians from foreign domination could only mean annexation to Italy; but the liberation of Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks might mean nothing more than autonomy. The most radical interpretation of the word 'liberation' was adopted, not only by spokesmen of the nationalities concerned, but by the Central Powers; yet on Aug. 14, 1917, Lord Robert Cecil stated that the British Government was not pledged to any form of liberation. In other words no decision had been reached concerning the preservation of the Hapsburg Empire in the event of victory. No reference was made to the future of the German colonies.

The reply of the Allies to President Wilson was followed on Jan. 16, 1917, by a despatch from Balfour, Grey's successor as Foreign Secretary, explaining that in the opinion of the British people a durable peace was impossible without the victory of the Allies, since it depended on three conditions. 'The first is that the existing causes of international unrest should be as far as possible removed or weakened. The second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own people. The third is that behind International Law, and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor.'

No further official announcement of British war aims was made during 1917. No notice was taken of the Reichstag Resolution of July 19, declaring that it strove for a peace of compromise and the permanent reconciliation of the peoples, but an appeal from the Vatican to the belligerents on August 1 was not wholly ignored. The struggle, declared the Pope, was becoming a useless massacre, and ought to be ended by a peace without annexations or indemnities, and followed by the reduction of armaments and a system of arbitration. President Wilson replied that the rulers of Germany could not be trusted; but Britain, like France and Italy, made no public response. The view of the British Government was conveyed in a letter of August 21 to our Special Envoy

at the Vatican. Till the Central Powers and their allies stated officially how far they were willing to go in regard to reparation and restoration, announced their war aims, and suggested measures for guaranteeing that the world would not again be plunged into similar horrors, any progress towards peace was unlikely. 'It appears to be useless to endeavour to bring about an agreement between the belligerents until the points of difference between them are clearly known, and neither Germany nor Austria has as yet made any statement corresponding to that issued by the Allies in answer to the note of President Wilson.' The Pope asked for and received a copy of this letter.

Despite the statement that nothing could be done from the British side till the Central Powers announced their aims, the Prime Minister, in a speech to the Trade Unions on Jan. 5, 1918, set forth the war aims of Great Britain more fully than ever before. The programme had been submitted to Asquith and Grey, to the leaders of the Labour Party, and to representatives of the Dominions, and he claimed that he was speaking for the nation and the Empire. The moderation of tone was in marked contrast to the strident self-confidence of the Allied reply to President Wilson a year earlier. The collapse of Russia and the Italian disaster at Caporetto had improved the military prospects of the Central Powers; American troops were slow in arriving; and Lord Lansdowne's letter of Nov. 28, 1917, published in the 'Daily Telegraph,' had argued that an indefinite prolongation of the war would ruin the civilised world.

The British, began Lloyd George, were not aiming at the destruction or disruption of Germany, and would not fight merely to destroy her constitution; but military autocracy was dangerous and out of date. The adoption of a really democratic constitution would be the most convincing evidence that the old spirit of military domination had died, and would make it easier to conclude a democratic peace. 'The first requirement always put forward by the British Government and their Allies has been the independence of Belgium, and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Roumania. We mean to stand by the French democracy

to the death in the demand for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side with the new democracy of Russia. But if her present rulers take action independent of the Allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people. We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe.'

The curious word 'reconsideration' applied to the problem of Alsace-Lorraine suggested the possibility of something less than the integral return of these provinces to France, and the reference to the Hapsburg Empire revealed a similar diminution of demands. 'The break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims; but genuine self-government must be granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it.' In one case, however, complete emancipation was essential. 'We regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own tongue and race.' The declaration concerning Roumania, on the other hand, was studiously vague. 'We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations.'

If the reference to Austria-Hungary merely explained and limited the formula of Jan. 10, 1917, the passage about Turkey was a definite retreat. 'We are not fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, nor of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.' The Straits, however, were to be internationalised and neutralised. Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine were entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. 'What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not be here discussed; but it would be impossible to restore these territories to their former sovereignty. Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our Allies on this and other subjects. I can only say that, as new circumstances like the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are and always have been perfectly

ready to discuss them with our Allies.' The 'arrangements' to which Lloyd George referred were recorded in the secret treaties concluded by the Tsarist Government and published by the Bolsheviks after their accession to power in November 1917. The first reference to the German colonies made during the war was vague. They would be held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants. The governing consideration should be 'to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or governments. The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of other occupied European territories.' No decision was announced on the question whether any of the colonies should be allowed to remain in German hands.

After dealing with territorial problems the Prime Minister turned to other considerations. There must be reparation for injuries inflicted in violation of International Law, such as those on British seamen. In the world shortage of raw materials, those countries which controlled them would naturally help themselves and their friends first, but, as circumstances changed, the settlement would change also. Finally, a great attempt must be made to establish by some international organisation an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes. Three conditions were essential to permanent peace—the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties, a territorial settlement based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed, and the creation of some international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war. 'On those conditions the British Empire would welcome peace; to secure those conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.'

During the whole course of the conflict no other belligerent, not even President Wilson in the Fourteen Points announced two days later, issued a declaration of war aims so elaborate and precise. The change of tone in the speech was recognised by the Central Powers; but the comments from Hertling, the German Chancellor, and Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, were pronounced

unsatisfactory by the Supreme War Council of the Allies at Versailles on Feb. 4, 1918, and the negotiations then in progress at Brest-Litovsk were said to disclose plans of conquest and spoliation. The Supreme Council, therefore, decided that the only immediate task was the prosecution of the war with the utmost vigour till a change of temper appeared in the enemy governments and peoples. This declaration was repeated at the opening of Parliament on February 12, when the Prime Minister declared that insistence on the integrity of the possessions of the enemy Powers made negotiations impossible. There was no use crying peace, he declared, when there was no peace.

In referring to the peoples of the Hapsburg Empire on Jan. 5, 1918, Lloyd George demanded separation for the Italians alone. Five months later, on June 3, 1918, though the great German offensive launched on March 21 was still in progress, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, meeting at Versailles on June 3, issued an important declaration. 1. The creation of a united and independent Polish state, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe. 2. The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government: 'The national aspirations of Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia for liberty have the liveliest sympathy of this Government, and they desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slav peoples.' The phraseology was somewhat involved, but the formula registered a notable advance towards the recognition of an independent Czecho-Slovak state for which Masaryk and Benes had been working.

The tide of battle in France turned on August 8, and on October 5, Prince Max of Baden, the new German Chancellor, requested President Wilson to initiate the discussion of peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. An exchange of Notes followed between Washington and Berlin, and on November 5 the Allies announced the conditions on which they would be ready to negotiate. 'Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's

Address of January 8 (1918), and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must point out that Clause II, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference. Further, the President declared, on January 8, that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.' President Wilson admitted this interpretation, and on November 11 Germany accepted the terms of the Armistice announced by Foch on November 9. Her allies had already laid down their arms.

The British Delegation arrived in Paris on Jan. 11, 1919, without a detailed programme, but knowing perfectly well what they wished to be done. The British people had expressed its feelings in a General Election. Germany should be made incapable of renewed attack by land and sea, should surrender her colonies, pay for the war to the limit of her ability, and hand over certain war criminals for trial. The Fourteen Points had been accepted by the British Government, subject to two exceptions. Moreover, the official declarations made during the war were on record. In Lloyd George's words, the main outlines of the Treaty of Versailles were defined and fixed, not in the hour of victory, but during the years in which the struggle was going on and when the issue was still in doubt. Great Britain, however, could not dictate to her allies, and the political position of France, as the seat of the Conference and the victim of invasion, was very strong. Thus the result of the discussions was bound to be a compromise. From the outset a difference of attitude between London and Paris was revealed. The British Delegation desired to avoid decisions which the new German Government might feel unwilling to accept, for in that case the war would be resumed and Central Europe, it was feared, might become Communist. More-

over, as Lloyd George explains, our peace aims were so framed as to convince America, and especially the peace-loving and anti-Imperialist President, that our objectives were fundamentally just. France, on the other hand, was prepared to take more risks in obtaining a settlement which in her opinion would guarantee her security.

The Prime Minister was blamed in some quarters for the violence of his speeches during the General Election, and he was held mainly responsible for the intransigent character of the new Parliament ; but further reflection convinced him that it would be unwise to press the defeated enemy too hard. When the difference of outlook had become fully apparent, he drew up a Memorandum on March 26, 1919, setting forth his view of the conditions, not of a temporary settlement, but of a lasting peace. A few sentences will show the character of this important document, which was addressed in the first place to Clemenceau, but was also intended as a warning to his more impatient followers at home. ' You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force, and her navy to that of a fifth-rate Power ; all the same, in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the Peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The deep impression made upon the human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the Great War. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice, or of fair play. To achieve redress our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless ; but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph, will never be forgotten or forgiven. For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of small states, many of them

consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land.' The victors, he added, should try to act as if they were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war. A just settlement must be supplemented by a League of Nations, a limitation of the armaments of the victors no less than of the vanquished, and the admission of Germany to the League after accepting the terms of the Allies and establishing a stable democratic government.

The chief difference between the British and French delegations was in regard to the left bank of the Rhine, which the latter believed to be the only effective barrier against invasion. To the creation of a new and larger Alsace-Lorraine the British were unalterably opposed, and they were supported by President Wilson. A partial equivalent was offered in the form of an Anglo-American promise of military support in the event of unprovoked German aggression. The compromise was reluctantly accepted by the French as the best they could get, and it was embodied in the treaty of guarantee signed on June 28, the same day as the Treaty of Versailles. Its inadequacy in French eyes arose from the fact that it was a joint, not a separate guarantee, since the British guarantee was only to come into force when the corresponding treaty between France and the United States was ratified—a condition which was not fulfilled.

In his authoritative work 'The Truth about the Peace Treaties' Lloyd George argues that the settlement was just and in accordance with the principles officially proclaimed during the struggle. The surrender of the German fleet appeared to remove the danger which had been the main factor driving England into the Franco-Russian camp. But how far had the four war aims announced by Asquith in November 1914 been fulfilled? Had Belgium 'recovered all and more than all that she had sacrificed'? She was liberated, compensated, and enlarged. Was France 'adequately secured against the menace of aggression'? Her security was buttressed by the permanent demilitarisation of the Rhineland, the occupation of the Saar territory for fifteen years, and an Anglo-American promise of military support in the event

of German aggression. Had the rights of the smaller nationalities been 'placed on an unassailable foundation'? On the whole the new frontiers were more in accordance with the wishes of the various races of Central Europe than those existing in 1914, and provision was made for the protection of minorities; but their rights could not be said to be effectively guaranteed. Had the military dominion of Prussia been finally destroyed? The German army was limited to 100,000 men, the German navy was forbidden to possess capital ships and submarines, and only civilian aeroplanes were allowed. The return to France of Alsace-Lorraine with its valuable iron resources was a further obstacle to the revival of formidable German armaments. Finally, the League of Nations, in the making of which British statesmen had taken an important part, was expected to prevent or defeat aggression from any quarter and to facilitate peaceful change. Whether these and other measures would finally destroy Prussian militarism only time could show.

Regarding the Treaty of Versailles as a whole, British statesmen could claim to have accomplished their war aims so far as the opinion of the other signatories allowed. What they did not and could not foresee was the gradual disintegration of the Grand Alliance which had made a dictated settlement possible, and the consequential escape of defeated Germany from the weakness and isolation in which she found herself at the end of the war.

G. P. GOOCH.

Art. 5.—ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.

It is one hundred and fifty years since, under the impulse of the Evangelical Revival, the British Protestant Churches began their organised efforts to spread the Christian Faith in foreign countries. It was during the Napoleonic period that British Christians were brought squarely to face the claims of the world and the needs of peoples outside this country. Even to glance down a list of societies which were founded during that period for

the purpose of missions abroad is to realise something of the resilience and confidence of the British character at a time when the long war was peculiarly exacting.

The new outburst of Christian missions began at a time of the fresh blossoming of the British creative spirit when, to quote G. M. Trevelyan, 'men seemed to inhale vigour and genius with the island air.' Not that there were many outstandingly notable men at the beginnings, neither is there one flaming genius sending out trumpet calls to service abroad. It was a new resurgence on the part of the rank and file of Christians all over Britain.*

Behind it all lay a deep religious and theological compulsion which gave the new movement its drive and urgency. Under the inspiration of the preaching and teaching of the Evangelical Revival the sense of a judgment on the world gave a finality to all Christian witness. The Judgment was immediate, and the thought of millions perishing in 'heathen darkness' was the deep fundamental note. It accounted for much of the simple and devoted bravery of many unknown men and women in the fever-ridden areas of Africa and on the scorching plains of India. It added a righteous intolerance and dogmatic certainty to the movement, but it also added a touch of glory to those who went which was reflected on those who stayed at home and supported the missions by their sacrificial giving.

Just as in the first century Roman world, so in the early nineteenth century, the spread of the Faith was assisted by a new ease in travel and communications. The re-born geographical curiosity about distant places, and a growing anthropological zest, ran alongside the religious compulsion. Many contributions to human knowledge were made by the early missionary pioneers. They were often the first white settlers in remote places, and for most parts of Africa and the Pacific their letters and journals form the basis of the first written knowledge. They made mistakes. Their eagerness often outdistanced their wisdom, and many of the early men were without

* The first group of missionaries of the London Missionary Society to the South Seas (1796) included five carpenters, two tailors, two shoe makers, two weavers, two brick-layers, a shop-keeper, harness-maker, gentleman's servant, gardener, surgeon, blacksmith, cooper, butcher, cotton manufacturer, linen-draper, cabinet-maker, six wives, a boy, and two babies.

adequate general education, and so lacked knowledge of the complex fabric of custom and observance which composed the native life of the countries they went to. They worked too under the belief of quick victories for the Christian Faith and a speedy dawning of 'the day of the Lord.' Those millennial hopes faded as the length and stringency of the task appeared more clearly, but their disappearance helped to emphasise the task of founding the Church as the main purpose of Christian missions.

According to the 1938 statistics,* there were 27,483 Protestant missionaries—men and women, ordained and lay, doctors and teachers—at work in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Island world as compared with 28,010 in 1925, and 14,374 in 1903. This drop within thirteen years is surprisingly small in view of the effect of the 'depression years' in the two main 'sending countries' of America and Britain. But it is mainly an indication of the growth of responsibility in the mission fields on the part of nationals of the countries. All through the nineteenth century and up to the period of the 1914 war, foreign missionary personnel was growing as missions expanded geographically. But with the emergence of the indigenous church the nationals of the various fields begin to stand prominently in the picture, and in many places to supersede the foreign missionary. From 1903 to 1938 their numbers increased from 72,215 to 203,468 whole-time workers. Ordained nationals have been increasing at the rate of 588 men a year to a total of 17,789 in 1938, so that they now exceed ordained missionaries by more than 10,000. In China the missionary staff has fallen from 7,663 to 6,020, while ordained Chinese have risen from 1,966 to 2,196; in India the corresponding numbers are 5,114 missionaries and 2,440 ordained Indians. But in the various African territories there has been a striking increase in the foreign staff from 6,289 to 8,447, while nearly every territory shows large increases in ordained Africans—Gold Coast, 97 to 165; Belgian Congo, 5 to 336; South Africa, 513 to 2,489; Southern Rhodesia, 20 to 84; Tanganyika, 27 to 114.

The emergence of an indigenous Christian Church in

* 'Statistical Survey of the World Mission of the Christian Church, 1938,' pp. 2 and 3 (International Missionary Council). Reliable statistics began to be gathered in 1903.

nearly every mission field, as the result of 150 years of missions, is perhaps even more strikingly illustrated when the growth in membership of the last four years is considered. The total number of communicants is 6,045,000 compared with 1,214,000 in 1903. In Africa, south of the Sahara, the number of communicants has multiplied five-fold in the present century, and is now about two millions. Including Roman Catholics, about seven out of every hundred negro Africans are now professing Christians. In China communicants have multiplied about five-fold in the present century in spite of the tremendous setback at the time of the Boxer Rising. In India, where the growth of the Christian Church reflects the enormous accessions from the 'untouchable' classes during the last fifty years, the number of communicants is now three times what it was a hundred years ago, and altogether the whole Christian community has multiplied ten-fold in that time. The total Protestant Christian community in the mission field is now 13,036,000.

Alongside these striking advances of Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholic missions also show an extensive growth. The number of missionary priests in 1938 was 10,285, and native priests 6,255, with a total number of 16,921,000 communicants. Since 1918 the Roman Catholic Church has been specially stressing the creation of an indigenous clergy, and in almost every land the number of priests and of lay brothers and sisters has risen, and has been accompanied by the creation of a number of native bishops. Roman Catholic missions are also being greatly strengthened in their institutional work—hospitals, dispensaries, and schools—in which they were considerably behind Protestant missions. To staff this work the Roman Catholic Church is able to depend upon the great and devoted army of lay brothers and sisters who at present number nearly 25,000, while their native colleagues almost reach the same total; while there are in addition some 74,000 native catechists and 61,000 teachers of different grades. The two great wings of the Christian Church, while not officially cooperating in the mission field, have in the last twenty-five years had a very similar policy in stressing the importance of the indigenous church and the growth of a native ministry. Protestant missions have perhaps been quicker to put native ministers and

clergy in positions of authority, but in making this comparison the much longer period of training for the Roman Catholic priesthood must be taken into account. The 'comity of missions' which has grown up amongst the Protestant bodies in the last fifty years, by which certain territories have been recognised as belonging to particular missions, has never been observed by the Roman Catholic Church and difficulties have arisen in consequence. But those difficulties are less now that indigenous churches are growing up, and in educational affairs especially there is consultation and even cooperation on the field in certain areas.

The emergence of autonomous churches in every mission field is the prime factor in the modern history of the universal church. Those churches are at various stages of growth, and most of them still need considerable help in men and money from the older Christendom of the West. They have grown into a kind of spiritual 'dominion status' and some illustrations of this fact may be taken from the growth of the Anglican communion between 1800 and 1939. In 1800 there were only two Anglican dioceses outside the British Isles and the United States; by 1850 there were 24; in 1900, 97, and in 1939 the total had grown to 146.

The Church of India, Burma, and Ceylon with its fourteen dioceses is now (since 1928) quite separate legally from the Church of England, and under its Constitution (1930) elects its own bishops (three are now Indians) and provides for its own support without aid from the State. It is through this church that the Anglican Missionary Societies' work, and something of its spirit, is seen in this comment by the Bishop of Calcutta.*

'The spirit of nationalism which has strongly developed in the Indian Christian community is finding expression in their desire to be more independent of foreign aid in their church work. One welcomes this growing sense of responsibility for the extension of Christ's kingdom in their own country. I think that there is a growing readiness to recognise that the difficulties, which decreased financial support causes, to carrying on mission work on the old-established lines, are in reality a sign of the coming of Christ to call us to this

* 'Bridge Builders' (1942), p. 49.

realisation of the individual's responsibility for taking his share in the work of evangelisation, not as a paid worker, but as a simple member of the Church, conscious that he is Christ's instrument for reconciling all men to the Father.'

The great churches of the United States, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa have all grown up as a result of the missionary outreach of the last 150 years. Their growth has been helped enormously by the 'British dispersion' and they in their turn have become missionary churches with great commitments in India, Africa, and the Far East. Their link with the 'mother church' in Britain is centred in the 'Lambeth Conference,' to which every ten years the bishops of the world Anglican communion come. Invitations to the 1940 Conference were already being dispatched when the present war broke out; including 104 to the bishops in the United States. To help the British Missionary Societies maintain their work in war time, the American Episcopal Church has collected over £100,000.

In China there are twelve dioceses of the *Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui* (Holy Catholic Church in China) with nine Chinese bishops. The sister church, which has mainly grown out of non-Anglican societies, is the Church of Christ in China with 23 per cent. of the total Protestant Christians. The Lutheran Church is also strong, and together these three Chinese Churches include a third of the Protestant communicants which number slightly over half-a-million as compared with 112,808 in 1903.

In Africa the Anglican communion has twenty-eight dioceses of immense size,* and very scattered populations except in Uganda, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast. There is a powerful Methodist Church on the Gold Coast with fifty ordained Africans, 400 catechists, a church membership of 60,000 with a total Christian community of a quarter of a million. In 1937 its financial accounts totalled 41,154*l.*, of which 35,545*l.* was raised by the Church itself, and only 5,609*l.* came from the Missionary Society in Britain.† This is characteristic of many parts of the Christian Church in Africa.

* The Diocese of Kimberley is 377,000 square miles with a population of 447,550 (Africans, European, and coloured), and a church population of 23,000.

† Compare this with the Methodist district of Hyderabad, where out of 34,460*l.* in 1937, 32,991*l.* had to be provided from Britain.

'African members of the Christian Church have a very high standard of giving in comparison with their material resources. They contribute in money, in labour, and in gifts in kind to the support of the Church. In one part of the Southern Sudan the introduction of the envelope system of giving led to a 300 per cent. increase. A large number of teachers there give 10 per cent. of their month's salary. In the Embu district of Uganda, except for local Native Council grants, the school and church work are almost entirely self-supporting; the people themselves raise over 1,000*l.* a year in cash and are responsible for the upkeep of all property. In the Anglican diocese east of the Niger the last report of amounts of local contributions was 61,000*l.* *

One of the most remarkable instances of church growth is the missionary history of the last hundred years is in the Samoan Islands. The first missionary of the London Missionary Society landed there in 1830. To-day Christianity is the acknowledged religion of the whole group of Islands, and the church is the cultural and educational centre of the island life. In 1901 there were fourteen European missionaries, but to-day there are only six who 'carry no formal authority beyond that of ordinary members of the Church Assembly.' † This church of some 60,000 members is entirely self-supporting, and self-governing, and has its own distinguished record of evangelisation in other parts of the Pacific. It runs its own theological college, schools, printing press, and magazine, ‡ and in addition provides 2,000*l.* annually to cover the cost of the European missionaries including passage expenses, and sends generous gifts for missionary work in India and China.

The establishment and growth of strong indigenous churches, although still partially dependent on the resources of the West, is a remarkable fact when it is remembered that the missionary movement has not always been looked upon favourably by government and trading interests. They have frequently resented the presence of the 'interfering missionary.' Right through the nineteenth century, and into the present day, wherever

* 'Five Points for Africa,' by Margaret Wrong, p. 130.

† 'Pacific Pilgrimage,' by Norman Goodall, p. 34.

‡ This magazine, 'Sulu,' first published Stevenson's story, 'The Bottle Imp,' in 1893.

there has been exploitation or unfair dealing between different races, the missionary on the spot has usually been the first to expose the evil. He has regarded himself as a 'trustee' for the 'backward' races and a guide to them in their development. From this has flowered the modern conception of 'trusteeship' which has inspired our colonial philosophy and practice during the last fifty years, and from that came the mandatory principle of the League of Nations.

This aspect of missions has often been misunderstood by the anti-imperialist who is fond of pointing out the close association of 'Missions and Empire.' Livingstone is often quoted as one who came very close to being 'Empire builder,' and undoubtedly he was in the right sense. But it was his missionary passion which drove him on into Central Africa to stamp out slavery and to open a vast realm to 'Christianity and commerce.' He regarded honourable trade as being one of the most satisfactory ways of bringing Central Africa into the orbit of civilisation. Four months before his death (1873) he wrote to his brother John :

'If the good Lord gives me strength and influence to complete the task in spite of everything, I shall not grudge my hunger and toils. Above all, if He permits me to put a stop to the enormous evils of this island slave trade, I shall bless His name with all my heart. The Nile sources are valuable to me only as a means of opening my mouth with power.' *

From the death of Livingstone onwards Christian missions have made remarkable progress in all directions in Africa. The Scottish Missions entered Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Kenya, so that to-day from Blantyre, in Southern Nyasaland, to Livingstonia, on the high plateau at the northern end of Lake Nyasa, are churches, schools, and medical work under strong African leaders. The Universities Mission went into Central Africa, together with the London Missionary Society, while in Kenya and Uganda the Church Missionary Society has vigorous 'younger churches' under its care. One of the most significant modern ventures is the United Missions to the Central African Copper Belt, in which six

* Quoted in R. J. Campbell's 'Livingstone,' p. 327.

separate missions have combined to staff a united team for work amongst the 17,000 African miners. It shows that separate organisations can pool resources both in men and money to meet a situation which no one singly could manage. At Senga Hill in Northern Rhodesia there is a pioneer agricultural school in which Protestant and Roman Catholic missions are cooperating to teach young Africans better methods of farming. Africa has many examples of cooperative ventures between missions for the good of the people.

From this concern for the life and welfare of ordinary men, which characterises Christian missions everywhere in the world, arose their prodigious educational efforts. No doubt the central desire was to teach the Faith and to produce literates who could read the Bible. But missions soon realised that they were deeply committed to education for the sake of the whole man and the community he lived in. Missions were far ahead of government in this, specially in India and Africa. In almost every branch of education in India missions were pioneers, and to-day they have twenty-three colleges at, or approaching, university standard with nearly eight thousand students, mainly non-Christian, in them. At the primary stage there are over 13,000 schools with 600,000 pupils and over 300 high schools with 67,000 pupils. It is estimated that one quarter of the primary education of India is being done by Christian missions.

In literacy the Christian community far outstrips the average 8 per cent. for the rest of India by reaching 22 per cent. In the education of women the achievement of Christian Missions is acknowledged by Hindu and Moslem alike.

Speaking at a meeting of the All-India Women's Conference, Dr Muthulakshmi Reddi * said :

' I honestly believe that missionaries have done more for women's education in this country than government itself. The woman population of this country has been placed under a deep debt of gratitude to the several missionary agencies for their valuable contribution to the educational uplift of Indian women. Of course at present India can boast of several other religious bodies such as the Brahmo Samaj, the

* Quoted in 'Modern India and the West,' p. 455.

Ramakrishna Mission, Arya Samaj, etc., doing work in the field of women's education, but in the past the Christian missionaries were the only agencies in that field. . . . Had it not been for these noble bands of Christian women teachers who are the product of the missionary training schools, even this much advancement in the education of the Indian women would not have been possible; even at this day, in every province, we find the missionary women teachers working hard in a spirit of love and faith, in out-of-the-way villages, where the Hindu and Muslim women dare not penetrate.'

Africa provides another striking illustration of the place of missions in education, because the declared policy of government is that African education must be based on religion, and that primary and secondary education should be left in the hands of the missions. This ideal of cooperation between government and missions was well expressed by Sir Philip Mitchell while still Governor of Uganda.*

'The case for cooperation between governments and missionary societies is this basic one—that the civilised society, the moral and spiritual values, the liberty, justice, and security for which the Empire is fighting again to-day are products of a full and whole-hearted cooperation in the past between Church and State, and that we know no other means of producing these ends. We have, therefore, a duty to the African peoples committed to our charge—to bring to the problem of their development the same methods and forces as have produced our own, unless, indeed, we are to write off the whole of our own civilisation as a ghastly failure.

To make this ideal effective missions are entrusted each year with very large amounts of money for education from government. One society, mainly in East Africa, receives 97,000*l.* a year, and another mainly in West Africa, 66,000*l.* a year for its educational work.

The influential position which the various branches of the Christian Church have won for themselves in China is largely due to their obvious readiness to serve China in every way, and also to their moral integrity and spiritual power. Although tiny in numbers (only 1 per cent. of the population) Chinese Christians are prominent in the national life; their schools and colleges have led the way

* Quoted in 'East and West Review,' July 1941.

in giving China modern education ; in war and famine relief both church and missions have taken a major share ; the promotion of the ' industrial cooperatives ' was largely due to Christian initiative, and the new place of Chinese women in public life is almost wholly due to Christian influence and training. The fact, too, that the Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and his wife are devout Christians has had a great moral and spiritual effect on Chinese life, and has undoubtedly preserved the Chinese from much bitterness and hatred during the long war period.

Summing up the future of the Christian faith in China, Mr Ronald Rees, lately one of the Secretaries of the National Christian Council of China,* says :

' First, there is no great religious system competing with the Christian Faith in China. It is a very different situation from that of India or Africa. The real alternatives, at least for young China, are scientific humanism or communism.

Secondly, the anti-Christian movement has gone. It was mixed up with the agitation against foreign imperialism. To-day there are no political barriers, as there are in India or Africa, to make the acceptance of Christ more difficult.

Thirdly, during the five years of war the Church has won its way into the respect and confidence of the Chinese people. The service and devotion of Christians, both in occupied and Free China, have had results that were not foreseen. Minds and hearts have been opened. The Church has become an accepted institution in Chinese life, and men are willing and eager to hear the message of Christ and His Cross.

Fourthly, there are now Chinese Christian leaders able to take responsibility. The Church has taken root in Chinese soil. The leaders are still few. Experienced men and women, some with not much education but most capable and loyal, others with ability and training equal to the best we can provide, are assuming responsibility for the spread of the faith in their own land.'

It is astonishing that all this should have happened in China since the first British missionary of 1807 !

Another concern of missions which arises from their fundamental Christian purpose is the place of medical missions. Again missions were in front of government. It is estimated that to-day Protestant missions alone

* ' China Can Take It,' p. 56.

maintain in various parts of the world 1,100 hospitals with 68,600 beds, treating 850,000 in-patients annually. They are served by 2,265 doctors and 5,385 nurses (including foreign and national in both categories) who also give 19 million treatments to out-patients annually.

In the last fifty years missions have been compelled to plan their work bearing in mind two factors which were not present in the early days.

Firstly, they have been drawn into cooperative planning amongst themselves, so that to-day the major societies are in close and regular consultation through the International Missionary Council in London and New York which has had an enormous influence on the whole strategy of the universal church. Secondly, the fact of alert and progressive governments in colonial areas has had to be reckoned with. The 'free lance' days of mission work in a colonial territory are over. Missions have not, however, lost their independence, or in any way surrendered their main purpose of 'preaching the Gospel.' Those purposes remain secure and are recognised by colonial governments, and the *entente* between missions and government is for the sole purpose of serving the people of a territory most effectively. Each has need of the other for the good of the people.

The Papuan area of the great island of New Guinea is a prime illustration of the *entente*. Missions were there first, in 1874, before any white settlers. They established the method of 'friendship' with the people, with simple rules such as no land-snatching, no forcible removal of labour, no firearms, and no drink, which were later incorporated by government into law. This early understanding between the people and the 'new white men' was brilliantly used by the late Sir Hubert Murray in his unique administration of the Territory. Murray's way of mixing amongst the people; his ingenious methods of justice, and the placing of education entirely in the hands of missions was all part of the decreed policy of friendship. Until the Japanese landed in New Guinea there had been no warfare in the territory, for Murray settled internal disputes by police methods. The spirit of missions filtered into all parts of the people's life, and Murray was the first to acknowledge the great debt he and his government owed to them.

No survey of modern missions, however, can overlook the far-reaching effect that they have had on the world strategy of the Christian Church itself. It is the central purpose of missions to establish that church in every land. In doing so they have also made clear the supra-national; or ecumenical sense of the church, and have also contributed enormously towards the unity of the church. These two movements were given a significant impulse and direction at the great missionary conferences at Edinburgh (1910), Jerusalem (1928), and Madras (1938). There the church as a universal fact became apparent, and the strategic importance of the 'younger churches' of Africa, India, and the East was seen in a world setting. Those conferences enabled the church to see its faith and practice as 'global,' and from them came permanent machinery in the shape of National Christian Councils * linked with the International Missionary Council, and now the World Council of Churches. It was missionary expansion which compelled the divided churches to achieve some common thought and planning, and to confront a pagan world—both East and West—with an undivided faith. This growth of the Ecumenical Movement (which unfortunately does not include the Roman Catholic Church) especially in the years between the wars, is one of the brightest hopes for the future of Christendom.

Nineteenth-century missions imported many 'denominational labels' into the countries where they worked, but those historic divisions have little significance abroad. The Christians of the 'younger churches' insist that seeing there is one Faith there should be one Church, and they have already pioneered in unity in the three main churches of China, and in the South Indian Church proposals which are now on the eve of decision.

This impetus towards union from the mission field has kept this supreme issue alive for the Christian church throughout the world. At the Madras Meeting the Indian Bishop of Dornakal, after listening to western delegates urging the Indian churches to increase their cooperation and even unity, asked wistfully how the western churches could say that when they were hardly on speaking terms with one another !

* Curiously enough almost the last of these Councils to be established was the British Council of Churches (October 1942).

The Madras Conference summed up the movement towards unity very concisely :

' We can act together in the presentation of the Gospel to men and in the winning of them to the Christian faith ; but there is evidence that in the next necessary stage cooperation breaks down owing to divided church loyalty. From this standpoint, therefore, as well as from the growing spirit of unity that has resulted from common working at a common task, has come in many fields a deep and a growing conviction that the spirit of God is guiding the various branches of His Church to seek for the realisation of a visible and organic union. We recognise that not all share this conviction, and we respect their views ; but for many it has become the dominant concern and care. They find in it the verification in experience of the deep purpose of God as expressed in our Lord's high-priestly prayer for the one-ness of His followers " that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me." ' *

The triumph of Christian missions during the last 150 years is that in spite of the confusion and disruption of ' speaking terms ' between the separated churches, Christian missions have accomplished an immense revolution in the life of men and have succeeded, beyond the dreams of those who founded them, in establishing the Christian Church in every land, and have helped to bring nearer the unity of the whole Christian Church.

CECIL NORTHCOTT.

Art. 6.—AIR POWER AND 'THE DURATION.'

SOME at least of the misconception which prevails about the place and effect of air power in this war is due to the failure to remember that it is not the same war now as it was in 1940. Of course, we remember that we were all alone then and that we are not now. What is not understood so well is that ' the duration ' changed in 1941, in two steps : first in June and then in December. One might label the pre-June war a *ten-years' war* and the other a *five-years' war*. The periods quoted are, of course,

* ' The World Mission of the Church,' p. 154.

only estimates and approximations. The point is that what happened in 1941 meant the virtual halving of the probable length of the conflict.

In the ten-years' war we could look only to sea power and air power for victory. They are still, of course, essential factors of the problem, but now there is a third as well—land power. Then, we had no prospect of having that third means of securing a decision at our call. We were confronted by enemies whose metropolitan population was more than twice as large as ours. To expect any army which we could create to be able to meet the Axis armies on (numerically) equal terms was to expect the practically impossible. Yet we never despaired of being able eventually to win that war. 'With help from you we are confident that we can win, and win decisively, in 1942, if not before,' Lord Lothian told the American people on Dec. 11, 1940. And we never expected the help so asked for to be help in men. 'We do not need the gallant armies which are forming throughout the American Union,' said Mr Churchill in his broadcast of Feb. 9, 1941. 'We do not need them this year, nor next year, nor any year that I can foresee. But we do need most urgently the immense and continuous supply of war materials and technical apparatus of all kinds. . . . Give us the tools and we will finish the job.'

A little earlier, on Jan. 26, 1941, Mr William Bullitt, former American Ambassador to France, when asked by a Committee of the House of Representatives at Washington whether he thought Great Britain could defeat Germany without American intervention, replied: 'I do believe so emphatically. If Britain, with the aid of our production, can attain domination in the air and bomb Germany as England had been bombed, I do not believe the German people . . . would stand up under punishment such as Great Britain has taken.' He affirmed his belief that American man-power was not needed to ensure a British victory.

Only by sea and air action could we have finished the job and only after a very hard struggle. This was fully understood by well-informed commentators at the time, though sometimes forgotten now. One of the ablest of them, Captain Liddell Hart, wrote at the beginning of May 1941: 'If we can prevent a German victory, and

also avoid bleeding ourselves to death, we should be able to create, in conjunction with America, a combination of naval and air strength with economic power that would be capable of turning the scales and determining the future world order—even without an actually decisive use of force' ('Daily Mail,' May 6, 1941). To have relied at that time on the overthrow of the Axis armies in the field would have been to envisage not a ten but a thirty years' war.

Our only hope, if we were to secure an even respectable peace, was that the panorama of the air might unroll itself so satisfactorily for us that, taken in conjunction with our superiority at sea, it would rescue us from the fate which a clash on land must have entailed upon us. We were grasping in our extremity at the skirts of a development which far-seeing strategists had contemplated as a future possibility more than twenty years before. It was in August 1917 that the Prime Minister's Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids used the following words in their second report: 'The day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of naval and military operations may become secondary and subordinate.'

That forecast seemed to many to be one unlikely to be realised in our generation. We know that to two of the most distinguished soldiers of the time it presented itself almost as a heresy. Haig expressed his disagreement with the view implicit in it. So did Foch at the time. For him the right use of the bombing arm was one 'measured by the effect which it can produce on the forces utilised by the enemy in battle,' and its diversion from such tactical employment to attack industries and undermine morale amounted to the misuse of it for a secondary instead of a primary function.

Later, Foch was inclined, it seems, to reconsider the view which he then expressed. A few years afterwards he said: 'The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable; but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on the nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the

government and thus become decisive.' Indeed, such an effect has already been produced by air attack upon a minor Power. It was the merciless bombing of Rotterdam which, more than anything else, brought about the collapse of the Dutch resistance in May 1940. Against Britain, however, a few months later, the fury of the *Luftwaffe* expended itself in vain. Most certainly public opinion was not impressed to the point of disarming the Government. On the contrary it was steeled and hardened.

In those dark days the citizens of this country never lost faith, never doubted our ultimate triumph. Exactly how that triumph was to be achieved was not, perhaps, very clearly formulated in most people's minds. Those who did analyse the complexities of the situation had to admit that it would probably depend on the successful creation of a structure of air strength as massive as that of the sea power to the building of which the labour of generations had been devoted. A colossal undertaking was involved and one which it would have taken years to bring to completion. Those who understand this most fully did not shrink from the prospect. The alternative was, at worst, defeat, at best, a peace of compromise.

The whole outlook changed in the mid-summer of 1941. Hitler's insane attack on the Soviet Union transformed the situation profoundly. By it he brought into the field an enemy whose numerical strength was twice as great as his own. Nearly six months later the forces of freedom were doubled again. The entry of the United States into the conflict settled once and for all the problem of man-power, and, which was of no less importance, of machine-power, too. The war was really decided in December 1941. All that is in question now is its duration.

No doubt the more obvious consequences of these events were apparent to all, but there was a curious divergence in the conclusions drawn from them here and in the United States. In this country many people jumped to the conclusion that all that mattered henceforth was the destruction in battle of the German armed forces. The sooner we set about the business of helping the Soviet armies to accomplish that object the better. We must establish a second front in Europe as soon as

possible. The air offensive was all very well but it was, relatively, a secondary affair. It had accomplished very little, so far. Press and Parliament alike reflected the dissatisfaction felt with the results of our long-range bombing programme. There was a good deal of rather petulant criticism. Its authors did not stop to consider what the effect might be upon the minds of our air crews who ventured so gallantly into the encompassing darkness and dangers of the night sky of the Ruhr.

Such criticism was largely silenced by the historic raids of the spring of 1942. Their results were clear for all to see. At once there was apparent a tendency to draw from them conclusions which were, if anything, too far-reaching. That tendency was encouraged by the words, natural enough in the mouth of the chief of the bomber force, which Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris used in an interview with a press correspondent on May 5, 1942. 'If I could send 1,000 bombers to Germany every night,' he said, 'it would end the war by the autumn.' We did send 1,000 bombers a few weeks later—to Cologne on May 30, and to two other centres subsequently. What many people asked themselves was why did we not do it more frequently. Why, if Sir Arthur Harris's statement was correct, did we not finish off the war by a colossal air offensive such as he clearly favoured?

The truth was that the calls made upon Bomber Command for machines for other work were so great and insistent that the Command could but rarely mount such massed attacks; and in any event we were not in a position then to stage them upon the scale which would have been needed if quick results were to be achieved. We simply could not find the machines which would have had to be assembled if the most ambitious proposal were to be attempted; nor, for that matter, had we sufficient aerodromes. These facts were not understood here, or in America.

In America there was apparent an even more pronounced disposition to disregard the practical difficulties. An almost magical quality was credited to the air arm. The belief that it could bring about an early decision was widespread. One of the most powerful newspaper chains set in motion a popular campaign for the inauguration of a great air offensive which, it was claimed, would bring

Germany to terms within the space of three months. The influential periodical 'Time' pressed strongly for a bombing effort organised on a scale sufficient to enable ten raids to be carried out each month, 3,000 to 5,000 tons of bombs to be dropped in each raid and thirty-one key-towns to be devastated. The result, it was confidently affirmed, would be that Germany would have to shut up shop as a belligerent.

It was the logic of big business and of modern scientific advance, applied to war; and it had its advocates among the technical writers, too. Two of these, Major Alexander de Seversky and Mr W. B. Ziff, wrote books which became best sellers in America. Both pressed for an all-out air offensive against Germany. Practically the only difference between them was that de Seversky held that it should be launched from the United States, bombers of sufficiently great range being employed, while Ziff recommended that the fullest possible use should be made of Britain as a base. For both the air assault, upon which the maximum effort should be concentrated, was the surest and quickest road to victory. Both were inclined to dismiss the weather difficulty too lightly.

The effect of all this expert—and not so expert—testimony upon public opinion was evident in the result of a 'Gallup Poll' taken in the autumn of 1942. The question was asked whether, if there were a shortage of raw materials, the Army, the Navy or the Air Force should have first claim. Of those who answered, 52 per cent. thought that the Air Force should have the priority, while 11 and 9 per cent. voted for the Navy and the Army, respectively; 28 per cent. expressed no opinion. Of those who did give a definite opinion, 72 per cent. placed the Air Force first, 15 per cent. the Navy, and 13 per cent. the Army. Dr Gallup wrote: 'When historians come to write the history of this war, one fact singled out as having utmost importance may be the public's persistent and long-time belief in air power.'

Professional soldiers are sometimes accused of being inclined to assume that the next war is going to be exactly like the last. It is as true to say that amateur strategists are apt to fall into the opposite error of discussing the current war in terms applicable to the next—or even the one *after* the next. They are inclined to look too far

ahead and to disregard practical difficulties and limitations. Possibly this war *will* see the dreams of the more fervent enthusiasts of the blue-sky school realised. That, however, is a contingency which a responsible planning staff cannot assume as a basis for its calculations. Such a staff has to proceed warily. It must hedge to some extent.

The winner owes his success in some instances to his competitors having made the pace for him. The very fact that there are other runners in the race may be a help, not a hindrance. Paradoxical though the statement may appear, the best way of ensuring that Anglo-American air power wins through to overwhelming predominance in this war may be *not* to concentrate all our effort upon it but rather to treat it as one element in a combination, no part of which is neglected. The reason is that only the combination can create the conditions in which the air arm has the fullest opportunity for establishing supremacy.

The German Air Force, Mr Churchill stated in his broadcast on Nov. 29, 1942, is 'a wasting asset.' The new construction in Germany was not keeping pace with the losses. What we wanted was increased opportunities for increasing these losses. 'The new front from which the Americans and also the Royal Air Force are deploying along the Mediterranean shore ought,' he said, 'to give us these extra opportunities abundantly in 1943.' Already his forecast has been realised, as a beginning. In one day, on Jan. 2, 1943, the American and British air units operating with the 1st British and 5th American Armies destroyed twenty-eight enemy aircraft in Tunisia for the loss of seven of their own machines. There will be plenty of occasions on which the balance sheet will be as favourable, one may hope, to our side. Meanwhile the *Luftwaffe* is being steadily depleted on the eastern front.

In Russia and in North Africa the *Luftwaffe* cannot adhere to the policy which it has long been following in western Europe—the policy of declining combat. Day after day our Spitfires, and sometimes our Mustangs, trail their coats over Northern France and the Low Countries, but the German fighters remain obstinately earthbound and refuse to come up and fight. They can be persuaded to take off only when something more

serious (from the German point of view) than a fighter sweep is in question. In the combined operations against Dieppe on August 19 they had perforce to accept the challenge. They came flocking, indeed, from all parts of the occupied territories, and our fighters had the opportunity for which they had been praying. They shot down nearly a hundred enemy aircraft, with as many more 'probables,' on that one day. We had fairly severe losses ourselves, but then we and the Americans can afford losses and the Germans cannot.

The more such losses are multiplied, the easier will it be for the Anglo-American air forces to dominate the air of Western Europe. The effect of a sustained bombing offensive against Germany, we are often told, will be to 'soften the spot' for eventual operations by our land forces. That is true, but there is also the possibility of a reversal of this order of events to be discerned. Land operations such as those in Russia and North Africa, and later, probably on other fronts, involve incidentally such a wastage of the air effectives engaged that the belligerent less favourably situated in regard to replacement is adversely affected in *all* theatres of war. The result is, in time, a 'softening' of the 'spot'—the aerial spot—at which the Anglo-American bombing flotillas will strike when they begin to raid Germany on a hitherto unprecedented scale.

In other respects also the apparently divergent strategical plans interlock and support one another. If we did plump for an all-out air offensive, throwing everything in, we should have to look for results to its moral hardly less than to its physical effect. It could be completely successful only if it broke the will-to-war of the German people. Now, nothing can so profoundly shake a country's morale as the destruction of its armed forces, and almost as shattering is the realisation by a war-weary nation that those forces, though not actually defeated, are unable to impose a decision upon the enemy. The forces upon which Germany relies to bring us to terms are her powerful army and her formidable sub-surface navy. So long as these remain unbroken, or, at least, still afford hopes of an ultimate victory, the will-to-war will not be destroyed in the Reich. Any action which tends to defeat or neutralise those forces is calculated at

the same time to create the conditions in which a massive air assault will have the best chance of accomplishing its purpose of bringing about a collapse of the home-front in Germany.

Nor is that all. There is another interaction of land and air offensives which is hardly less important. By striking at the nerve-centres of German industry and transportation our bombers contribute directly to the success of our sea and land operations against the enemy's sea and land forces. That is, indeed, obvious; yet one sometimes hears criticism of our long-range offensive as if it were a diversion from more important duties. It is only when the connection is as clear as it was in the raids on north Italy, for instance, in October–November 1942, which were timed to support the movements in North Africa, that the fact that there is no real diversion of effort is generally appreciated.

There is an analogous interaction between the activities of the naval and the air services. The connection between the work of Coastal Command, and to a considerable extent of Bomber Command, on the one hand, and the work of the Navy on the other is obvious. The sailors and the airmen are engaged in the same task. Their object is to defeat the enemy's attempt to cut our maritime life-line, while at the same time interrupting his sea communications—such as are left to him. What is less commonly realised is the interconnection between these marine operations and the bombing offensive where morale is in question. The failure of the U-boat campaign would be the final blow to Hitler's hopes of victory. Knowledge of the failure would have an important reaction upon morale in Germany. It would be a contribution to that psychological attrition which it is one of the aims of our air offensive to maintain and intensify. Even in this limited sphere one cannot assert dogmatically that the action of any one arm will be decisive.

The question which has been asked here and in America, Will air power be decisive? admits, indeed, of no short and simple answer. One could reply to it. Yes, at a pinch, and a pinch it would have had to be if our war of 1940–41 had gone on; and it would have been a terribly protracted affair. Or one could say, Yes, in a future war; the ultimate limits of the march of air power

cannot be circumscribed. Looking at *this* war, however, and that is what really matters, one is forced to ask a prior question: *Why* should it have to be decisive? Why should the help of land power (sea power is not here in question) be disdained? We and our Allies shall have both kinds of power at our call. Let us use them. The question is in fact an unrealistic one. We must take this war as we find it, and it is a war of all arms. Just because it is, the influence of air power upon a decision will be all the more certain.

What can be claimed without fear of contradiction is that air power is an absolutely essential factor in the combination which will give us victory; and at the very heart of air power there stands the strategic offensive. The matter was placed in the proper perspective by Mr Churchill in his great speech at Ottawa on Dec. 30, 1941. 'While an ever-increasing bombing offensive against Germany will remain one of the principal methods of ending this war,' he said, 'it is not the only one which growing strength enables us to take into account.'

This view of the position is accepted now, it seems, by all who are not blind to realities. It has been endorsed in quarters which cannot be suspected of undue addiction to extremist or doctrinaire modes of thought. Leading articles in the Press reflect the informed reaction to it. "We are thoroughly committed to the large-scale bombing of Germany as part of our war-winning strategy," said the 'Daily Mail' on Sept. 18, 1942. 'It is doubtful whether this use of the air weapon by itself could win the war, but it is certain that we could not win without it.'

'There are still those who confuse themselves with the parrot question: Can the war be won by bombing Germany?' wrote the 'Daily Telegraph' on Sept. 19, 1942. 'No one of knowledge and judgment ever thought of speculating on such a possibility. The reason why the United Command must bomb Germany with all the power that can be provided is that without such a sustained and cumulative air offensive the war cannot be won at all.' That conclusion will not be disputed by anyone who preserves a sense of proportion. To claim more for air power, as some enthusiasts are inclined to do, is to harm, not to promote, the cause which they have at

heart, and, in the long run, the national cause, too. To claim less is appeasement, which is no less possible as between the arms of war than it is between nations.

To take this firm but reasonable line is not to shut one's eyes to the possibility that, while the probability is that the final straw which breaks the German camel's back will not be assignable with certainty to any one source, some unforeseen development may prove either the one or the other extreme view to have been right after all. The Russian army might conceivably win the war practically off its own bat, and a supporting Anglo-American land offensive might back it up and finish off the match. On the other hand, a tremendous Anglo-American air offensive might do the trick, the Soviet air force seconding it. Neither result is entirely out of the question. If either does materialise, unmistakably, the wiseacres may ask: Why did we not plump for this solution earlier? If we had gone all-out for it we should have finished off the war much sooner. That is being wise after the event. The sensible course now is to provide for both the possible solutions, within reason. We can do it. An intensive, round-the-clock bombing programme, carried out by our Lancasters, Stirlings, and Halifaxes (or their successors) by night and the American Flying Fortresses and Liberators (or their successors) by day, could be undertaken without any very serious detriment to our and America's preparations for important land offensives as well. By the mercy of Providence we (the United Nations) have the margin of strength that can be stretched to cover both these ventures; and, as fortunately, they interlock and each is calculated to facilitate the other.

Equally, and more obviously, to bank on an all-out air offensive would be a gambler's throw if meanwhile we were in danger of losing the war at sea; and we are in such danger unless we look constantly and anxiously to our Atlantic life-line. That line we must maintain at all costs. Here, again, we need perspective and balanced judgment. We should be wise to refrain, too, from debating where sea power ends and air power begins, or whether there is in fact any such thing as air power over blue water (of course there is). The two Services concerned must pull together, unselfishly. They are in the

same boat ; and they are in fact pulling together, for all they are worth. The quarrel, such as it is, is not between the fighting men. Why cannot we all follow their lead ?

J. M. SPAIGHT.

Art. 7.—A GLIMPSE OF BYRON.

FIVE years after Trafalgar, the navy was in the midst of one of those tedious periods in its history when, although the main enemy had been defeated at sea, the war was not yet over, and the prospect lay before it of dull routine service, followed by inevitable reduction of establishment. Excitement was welcome, particularly to the young, and to a midshipman, Frederick Chamier by name, the year 1810 brought a sight of Byron. His youthful picture is forgotten, but it is vivid, and the meeting probably helped to turn his own thoughts to letters, and that to some profit, since in later years he wrote a popular novel of the sea—'Tom Bowling.'

Chamier was at the time a boy of fourteen, serving in the frigate 'Salsette' in the Mediterranean. The life was hard ; and he had already seen service with the Walcheren Expedition, had taken part in the capture of a prize, and had learnt to record what he saw with an eye for detail which makes his long-neglected autobiography, 'The Life of a Sailor,' a store of information concerning the life of the Navy immediately after Nelson.

It was at Smyrna, while watching a realistic sham fight between some Turks and Mamelukes, that Chamier first saw Byron. The 'Salsette' had been ordered from Smyrna to Constantinople, where she was to receive the English minister and thence convey him to Malta. Byron, who was with Hobhouse on his Grand Tour, solicited a passage to the Porte, which was gladly granted by the captain, one Bathurst, an amiable man with an engaging stammer.

Off the island of Tenedos, in view of the plains of Troy, Chamier began a direct acquaintance. 'An orange brought me into notice with his lordship,' he wrote.

Byron had inquired of the Captain's steward if such a luxury was to be procured on board: the steward answered that he had none. 'I immediately ran below,' says Chamier, 'and from the till of my chest brought forth two ripe Smyrna oranges. Being well aware how the stall-women polish their fruit, by means of their lips and a blacking brush, I concluded a damp towel would answer every purpose, and having duly heightened the yellow skin of my fruit, returned and offered them.'

The acquaintance quickly ripened. Next day Byron asked that he might be landed on the plains of Troy, at which he had been gazing for hours through a telescope. The captain agreed. 'I will take this young acquaintance of mine with me, with your permission, Captain Bathurst,' said Byron, and in a few minutes a gig took them ashore, Byron with a fowling-piece on his shoulder.

'Troy and its plains were hallowed ground to his lordship,' wrote Chamier, 'which I ventured to profane, by blazing away at every bird I saw; and while the poet was imagining the great events of former days, I was lost in sweet hope of the next day's dinner.'

Byron, having explored the line of the old walls, 'brought himself to anchor upon the tomb of Patroclus' and read Homer, 'occasionally glancing his quick eye over the plains.' He was much amused by Chamier's leaping across the Scamander, then a mere rivulet. Having crossed to Tenedos, tasted sherbet, and smoked a pipe with the governor, the pair returned on board the same evening.

So dilatory were the Turkish authorities in according Captain Bathurst the necessary firman to pass the forts of the Dardanelles that the 'Salsette' was a whole month at anchor. Many excursions were made on shore, the longest being a ride to Abydos, in which Byron and his party took part, together with Bathurst and other officers. The poor captain did not get far. He had a disagreement with his horse, was seriously bruised, and was brought back to the frigate by Byron's servants.

Chamier was left under Byron's special care, and rode close by his side. About four miles inland they met a party of Turks, gorgeously clothed and mounted, and ready for instant battle with the unbelievers. 'Had it not been for Byron's coolness,' wrote Chamier, 'we should

have been minus a head or two before long.' The poet was able to establish the good intentions of his party, which ultimately arrived safely at Abydos. Here they were greeted by a grumbling English consul (by nationality an Italian Jew), and proceeded thence by boat to Sestos, on the European shore.

It was then that Byron made his first attempt at imitating Leander, rubbing himself over with oil and taking to the water like a duck. On first plunging in he complained of the coldness, but he swam well—decidedly well. The current was strong, the wind high, and the waves unpleasant. These were stout odds to contend with, and when he arrived about half way across, he gave up the attempt, was handed into the boat, and dressed.

'He did not appear in the least fatigued,' says Chamier, 'but looked as cold as charity, and as white as snow. He was cruelly mortified at the failure, and did not speak one word until he arrived on shore. His look was that of an angry, disappointed girl, and his upper lip curled, like that of a passionate woman.'

Having seen the town of Sestos, such as it was, the party hired another boat and sailed down the Dardanelles to the frigate. Chamier continues: 'On passing Fort Asia, the sentinel hailed us, and desired us to land. Lord Byron, who had recovered his gaiety with the rising of the moon, swore, in good modern Greek, that he would not land to please any Turk in Asia; whereupon the sentinel thought proper to practise firing at a mark, and began at the boat; he did not hit us, and we were soon out of his reach, for the current swept us at about the rate of six knots, and we had a sail into the bargain.

'We arrived safe, although the crew nearly mutinied when the first shot was fired. They might as well have attempted to move the mosque of St Sophia as turn Byron from his determination, which none but a woman could effect. It was a saying in after-life of Lord Byron's servant, "Every woman can govern my lord—but my lady." It appears by all accounts that men could neither intimidate nor manage the poet; he certainly was not easily led by our sex.

'At last the firman arrived, but the wind gradually died away, and the "Salsette" came to anchor once more close under the fort of Abydos. The next day Lord

Byron was up early, and made arrangements for his second and more successful attempt at swimming the Hellespont. Mr Ekenhead, an officer of marines, proposed to dispute the honour, and both gentlemen left the ship about nine o'clock, and landed on the European side. Above Sestos there is a narrow point of land which juts into the Dardanelles, and below Abydos there is a similar formation of coast, the point of the sandy bay on the Asiatic side projecting some distance. From point to point (that is, if they were opposite to each other) the distance would be about a mile—certainly not more; but as the current is rapid, and as it is impossible to swim directly across, the distance actually passed over would be between four or five miles.

'Mr Ekenhead took the lead, and kept it the whole way. He was much the better swimmer of the two, and by far the more powerful man. He accomplished his task, according to Lord Byron's account, in an hour and five minutes, and his lordship at one and a quarter. Both were fresh and free from fatigue, especially Ekenhead, who did not leave the water until Lord Byron arrived.'

Poor Ekenhead did not live to read the lines in 'Don Juan' in which this feat is referred to. On hearing of his promotion to captain, when the 'Salsette' eventually returned to Malta, he managed to tumble over the bridge which then separated Nix Mangiare Stairs from Valetta, after a party in celebration, and was killed on the spot.

In Constantinople, when the ship at last reached that place, Chamier had many strange experiences, several of which he was again fortunate enough to share with Byron. Among them was a ceremonial visit to the Sultan, Mahmoud II, during which they partook of the usual protracted Oriental feast, and were afterwards robbed. They also witnessed the bowstringing of no fewer than forty men accused of piracy, and the beheading of their leader, whose body was publicly exposed.

'Byron looked with horror at the appalling scene,' says Chamier. 'No man can form an idea of the distorted sight who has not seen it; and neither am I very much inclined to recall to my recollection the horrible appearance of the corpse. Not far from this exhibition stood a melancholy-looking Turk, endeavouring to scare away

some dogs ; but his attempts were fruitless, for, unmindful of our presence, they rushed at the body, and began lapping the blood, which still oozed from the neck. I never remember to have shuddered with so cold a shudder as I did at that moment ; and Byron, who ejaculated a sudden " Good God ! " turned abruptly away. It was altogether a scene never to be obliterated from a man's memory, and on a boy's mind it left the most unpleasant recollection. Those lines in the ' Siege of Corinth ' which some shudder at reading, and which few could ever scan with delight, are the vivid representation of the above anecdote :

' And he saw the lean dogs beneath the wall
Hold o'er the dead their carnival ;
Gorging and growling o'er carcass and limb,
They were too busy to bark at him.'

The frigate remained in Constantinople no less than four months before Mr Adair, the English minister, was ready to embark. When finally clear of the Hellespont, Bathurst directed his course towards the island of Zea, where they were to part with Byron. Chamier wrote : ' It fell to my duty to land his lordship ; and, in the discharge of this service, I had a warm and friendly shake of the hand from the first poet of the age, and received a handful of sequins to distribute to the boat's crew. Some Greeks took charge of his little luggage, for in this respect he was more slenderly provided than any traveller I ever knew. He turned towards the frigate, waved his handkerchief as an adieu, and then advanced into the interior of the island.'

In summing up his boyish impression of the poet, Chamier says : ' Every man who had the honour of Lord Byron's acquaintance, and who has since ventured before the public, has spoken much of his lordship's handsome appearance. As I consider beauty as only applicable to women, I would be understood here to attach the same weight to the word " handsome " that is generally given to beauty. I shall not place my opinion at variance with those who knew him a hundred times better than myself ; but certainly the impression on my mind is, that he was by no means the *very* handsome man some have imagined him to be.

'The deformity of limb, which annoyed him through life, was conspicuous to any man with eyes in his head ; and it was perfectly impossible for any shoemaker to disguise the clump foot. I really can scarcely credit that his lordship was so mortified at this visitation of Providence, when I have seen him thousands of times sitting on the taffrail, and swinging his legs about with unrestrained freedom. The fame which crowned his lordship in after-life made me anxious to remember his person and his manners, and I am quite satisfied that on board the 'Salsette' he never took any particular pains to hide his feet. He certainly did not swim across the Hellespont in Hessian boots ; and he dressed himself in the boat when he failed in his first attempt.'

Chamier never afterwards chanced upon his romantic hero ; but his impressions, as fresh as they were casual, have a charm which reflects as happily upon him as upon the poet.

II

Although Chamier was unlucky enough to miss Trafalgar, he served in the disastrous naval war of 1812 with America, during which his Admiral, Sir Peter Parker, was killed in his arms. He had, too, his fill of other excitement. Years later he met Bolivar. Besides these personal recollections, his work is full of the incidents of naval life, which even in peace time are often remarkable. Such, for instance, was the affair of the 'Magpie' schooner. The time would have been somewhere between the years 1827 and 1831, when the ship was under the command of Lieutenant Smith, her duty being to cruise off Cuba, in the hope of intercepting a pirate vessel which had already caused much damage, and which was sending insurance rates sky-high. One evening, in the calm between the fall of the sea-breeze and the coming of that from the land, the ship lay towards the shore and about eight miles away from the Colorados, a shoal at the western end of the island. Her fore-topsail was set, the yard braced for the starboard tack. On the port bow, a small dark cloud hung over the land ; otherwise all appeared serene.

The cloud grew, and the mate, who was on watch, became at length a trifle anxious. 'Mr Smith,' he called

down, 'I think the land breeze is coming off rather strong, sir; the clouds look very black.'

'Very well,' replied the captain; 'keep a sharp look out. I shall be on deck myself in a moment.'

Unfortunately, the mate did no more. Had he braced the fore-yard round, or furled the fore-topsail, the trouble might have been averted. He did neither, and a squall of wind, seeming to strike the vessel almost from alongside, instantly capsized her, almost before the watch had time to reach the deck.

The crew numbered twenty-four, of whom two were drowned at once. Then a calm set in, the moon shone brightly, and the ship's boat, though half full of water, floated with the survivors around her. But their unmethodical struggles merely rolled her over and over, and although all were safe from immediate death, unless and until the boat was righted, those who clung to her gunwales or scrambled on to her keel would certainly perish in time from exhaustion.

Smith, as soon as he could take command of the situation, ordered the boat to be righted, while two men got inside her to bale out the water with their hats. The others hung on to the gunwales until she was ready to receive fresh men for baling; and thus by degrees all could hope for rescue. Everything was going as well as the circumstances permitted until a man shouted that he saw the fin of a shark. Immediately there was panic, the boat was once more upset, and a vicious scramble for safety began, without method and without effect.

The man's alarm seemed to have been false. Smith persuaded those who clung to the gunwale to splash with their legs, and after furious efforts four men were again baling hard in the righted boat. Then, quite suddenly, about fifteen sharks came in amongst the men. The boat was overturned, and the position worse than ever.

Despite the general terror, the sharks did not at first seem inclined to seize their prize. They swam amongst the men, playing in the water, almost rubbing against them. But at last the real attack began. A limb was seized, a head disappeared under the water and, having once tasted blood, the fish continued their savagery.

Even at this dreadful moment the captain kept his courage and made his men obey him. The boat was

again righted and baling renewed. Smith cheered the men in from the stern, but, remitting his own splashing for a moment, had both legs severed above the knee. Two men at once dragged him into the stern sheets, but the boat heeled over and he disappeared into the sea.

The 'Magpie' was over-set at eight o'clock. By nine there were two survivors sprawled on the keel of the boat. The rest had perished. The sharks seemed for the time satisfied, and the two at length righted the boat, and once more began the task of baling. After many further alarms from the sharks, who, returning, swam close, they at length had most of the water clear. They then sank into an exhausted sleep, one forward and the other aft, so fearful that they scarcely dared to move.

When the sun awoke the two sailors it was only to make them realise their desperate position. Heat, hunger, thirst, and isolation were before them. They had no oars, no mast, nothing but the bare planks and a sailor's knife apiece. Hour upon hour they lay becalmed. They prayed, they quarrelled, they swore, they sucked salt water, and they shuddered at the sight of a fin. And then at last they saw a sail. It was a brig, and she was steering exactly in their direction with a light breeze behind her.

Their joy was frenzied. They did everything in their power to attract her attention. Their eyes were never off the ship. They shouted. They held a jacket aloft—and then, just as the brig was approaching within distance of rescue, the whole fabric of their hopes was destroyed : she bore away about three points and began to make more sail.

All the loose thwarts had been lost in the night ; nor could they move one of the fixed thwarts in order to paddle towards the ship. As a last throw, one of the sailors decided to swim towards rescue. He jumped into the water, kicking as vigorously as he could, and came at length within hailing distance. Even then he was not seen. The brig passed him, he was almost exhausted, when his final desperate leaps in the water attracted the attention of a man in the rigging of the vessel. She was hove to, a boat was lowered, and both seamen were saved.

The brig was American, and her captain at first suspected the two men of being pirates turned loose in a

mastless boat. The actual tale seemed scarcely credible. They were landed at Havannah, whence they were conveyed to Port Royal by man-o'-war. There they were court martialled. When the facts were known, they were recommended for promotion, and both ended their active service as warrant officers: a happy epilogue to as swift a disaster as ever occurred at sea.

III

Chamier's other great meeting, that with Bolivar, occurred almost at the end of his time at sea. He was not impressed by the patriot's looks, and described him as 'a thin, haggard, worn-out man in appearance, but very different in reality; he looked as unlike a great man, or one capable of great creation, as any I ever saw; he resembled a French postilion more than a warrior. When he addressed me, he never looked at my face; but occasionally cast a quick, scrutinising glance, more indicative of cunning than open manliness of behaviour.' But Chamier recognised his stature, saw something of his work of liberation, and felt his natural skill in leadership.

After much adventuring in South America, Chamier retired young, and gave to writing the energy he had taken to sea. Besides his novels, 'Ben Brace,' 'Jack Adams,' and many others, he wrote a book of travels in France and Switzerland, having chanced to be in France at the time of the Revolution of 1848. He was also given the task of continuing James's 'Naval History of Great Britain' down to the time at which he himself left the sea, and it is thus he is known to naval writers. He died in 1870, slipping into eternity almost unnoticed, having narrowly missed that greater skill or talent which makes Marryat so vital to this day.

OLIVER WARNER.

Art. 8.—BRITAIN AT WAR.

WHEN I wrote last, one name was on all our lips and filling all our thoughts—Stalingrad. That was on October 31, and for three months before that date we had watched with most anxious hearts the onward sweep of the fierce German onslaught, that double onslaught which was to give them the great city of steel and also the keys of the Caucasus as the main prizes of 1942 with the assurance, or at any rate, the well-grounded hope of victory in 1943. So the Germans thought, ignorant even after all the teachings of history that no such hope could really be well-founded. Then on November 15 I was enabled to add a postscript to record that Stalingrad still held and still fought back—‘all else,’ I wrote, ‘is change.’

How long ago all that seems to-day (February 16)! ‘All else’—it almost sounds ironic. The mightiest seesaw in war has been before us: in North Africa the continued chase of Rommel right across the rest of the Italian African Empire into Tripoli and beyond, the apparent absence of motion in the fulcrum, as it were, round Bizerta and Tunis, the disappearance of the Japanese from Guadalcanal, which is of a significance greater perhaps even than it seems, and—dominating all—the transformation scene on Germany’s Eastern front. So little is it any longer a question, will Stalingrad hold and still fight back, that Stalingrad is now a completed page of history, the largest and the most finished victory in all military annals, its only comparisons in modern times being Tannenberg and Sedan, and neither were in any degree the equal of the huge encirclement, the absolute annihilation of von Paulus and the Sixth German Army. A page of history so completed that already it lies quite in the past, the shattered remains of the unconquerable city now nearly 300 miles behind the front. For several days now the world has been wondering whether the victoriously advancing Russians would retake Rostov first or Kharkov: Rostov has won, but only by a short head—two days, in fact—and what no one would have thought possible two months ago is not merely an accomplished fact but the prelude to more and more spectacular successes. He would be a bold man now who would venture to predict with any certainty where the German

defence lines will be able to form. Leningrad has been relieved, Kursk has been regained, the maps in the daily newspapers have all been moved too far to the west now even to show Elista and the Grozny oil-fields; Orel and Dnepropetrovsk are threatened—there is no end to the changes that are now in being and the changes still to be.

And there is this to be noted, which (perhaps) distinguishes the Russian advances from any previous victories of their kind, namely, that the initial attacks were prepared with a secrecy that seems almost incredible and launched from open steppes with very poor rail communications behind them and the attacks now, after more than two months of incessant success, are not slowing up but augmenting and becoming easier to launch not so much because they are against a retreating, discouraged set of armies as because they have now a network of communications immediately behind them. In fact, for once it may even be true—up to a point, that is, and a point by no manner of means yet reached—that the farther the Russians go, the less difficult will their operations be to them.

However that be and whatever the immediately succeeding weeks may hold on Germany's Eastern front, whether Dr Benesh is right or over-sanguine in his latest broadcast to his people of Czechoslovakia in saying that the Germans will try to stand, first on the Dnieper and before Kiev, 'and then perhaps finally on the Dvina, at the Pripet Marshes, and on the Dniester,' this at all events is history, that the Russians by marvels of tenacity, organisation, and audacity—all three—have written into the annals of war imperishable deeds and altered the whole balance and prospects of the world conflict. So much more will have happened before the beginning of April that nothing more than that can appropriately be said here—but before passing from the events that have mesmerised all minds, let us spare one comment on German mentality. I do not mean Hitler of whom it has now been justly written, 'the man is no longer an actor of world-history. He is a prisoner of fate': whether he is again 'pacing his dug-out with blazing eyes,' as Goering declared him to be doing in the stress of the winter attacks of 1941-42, or meditating fresh atrocities now matters little, the war and the world are passing beyond him. I

mean the exhortations, very singular to our minds, now falling officially on German ears. How strange it is to hear that this aggressor nation, discomfited but not yet defeated, is being urged by Dr Goebbels and his tribe to imitate the fortitude of the people of the British Isles in the autumn of 1940—what possible comfort can they conceivably draw from such a remembrance? And, again, the exaltation of 'the heroic defenders of Stalingrad,' compared by German leaders to the little band of Greeks who perished at Thermopylæ—how is it possible to begin to understand a nation which can nerve itself to desperate efforts of resistance against the onswEEPing avalanche of Allied might by such extremities of balderdash? Von Paulus's trapped Army fought with very great stubbornness—not equal, incidentally, to the Japanese at Buna; but to compare 330,000 invaders to the men of Leonidas resisting invasion—what buffoonery, if such a word can fitly be used for something so deadly serious! One can but put beside this comparison the words of the Berlin military commentator, Capt. Ludvig Sertorius; speaking of that egregious last minute promotion of von Paulus to Field-Marshal, he said, 'The Fuehrer emphasises to the world that Germany does not consider the dwindling of the Sixth Army in the ruins of Stalingrad as a defeat.'

What in the world can be done with people of such mentality? That is the question which, already, even if perhaps a trifle prematurely, begins to loom up both in private and in public discussion. 'The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Staffs, having completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have now separated in order to put them into active and concerted execution'—so, with a quiet simplicity that has on it all the hall-marks of greatness, ended the official announcement of the Casablanca, or the 'unconditional surrender,' meeting—I feel these words to be worthy to be set beside the instructions given by the Prime Minister to General Alexander in the late summer and General Alexander's reply in early February that these had been fulfilled. But that is a digression, though all in keeping with the Anglo-Saxon outlook.

The plans are completed, the vast drama moves on, there is a sense of epic doom in the air, and there is no one who does not know that the great battle now raging

(February 16) from Leningrad to Rostov, the great pursuit, as even now it almost deserves to be called, is but the prelude to still more dramatic events not confined to one theatre of war but interlocking throughout all the world. Roaring and raging, Mars is straining everywhere to battle whilst Vulcan labours unremittingly in factory and field to keep him well supplied. That is all very wonderful and so complete a change that we have to rub our eyes as we look back and remember—and it is everywhere, as, for example, witness the Canberra correspondent of 'The Times,' 'Australia has reason to remember 1942 gratefully as a year of deliverance despite the tragic succession of events in the south-west Pacific with which it opened'—and that was said before the evacuation by the Japanese of Guadalcanal. Victory is not ours—yet: the road to it may conceivably not be prolonged, it may on the other hand wind on and on, but, whichever it is or does, it will be uphill and its stones drenched with blood. That we know: that we accept. What matters now is not the labour or even the sacrifices, but the undeniable certainty of the utter destruction of these powers of evil, more ghastly and more ruthless as they begin to totter to their fall even than in the hey-day of their pride.

Let us take but one example, among the most characteristic and horrifying: 'in Poland mass executions go on; in one area alone 6,000 Jews are being killed daily. Before being massacred the Jews are ordered to strip and their clothes are sent to Germany.' What is to be done with those who have ordered these atrocities, with those who have carried them out, and thirdly and not least—with those who have permitted them to endure and to increase? As the scales of inexorable justice begin now to sink down against the Axis powers, so does this question advance: we always knew, we who even in the darkest hours refused to believe that the cruelties of brute force could succeed in trampling out the lights of liberty, that one day we should have to try and answer it—and that day, though not yet here, is standing now, on tip-toe, in the wings.

There are two distinct categories of answers, and in due course a choice will have to be made between them. Are we, for example, to say with Isaiah, 'There is no peace, saith the Lord, unto the wicked?' or are we to

agree with Mr H. G. Wells who has recently written, 'I can see no particular harm in Goebbels. God help all propagandists everywhere if he is to be killed.' It would seem that those two sayings represent with some sharpness a fundamental divergence of view, and of the two, I personally—if I may parody Disraeli—am on the side of Isaiah. But the question cannot of course in the stern realities that will surround it be reduced to such simplicity: the two public protagonists, Lord Vansittart on the one hand and the Bishop of Chichester on the other, have lately clashed in a debate which, though in no way exhaustive, did reveal some of the many and great difficulties and complexities that beset the subject. We most of us remember the 'hang the Kaiser' and 'make Germany pay' ejaculations of 1918-19: we even retain in our memory a remark by one Winston Churchill, then, I think, Secretary of State for War, as to the desirability of squeezing our late enemies until the pips squeaked. Are we, some are beginning already to wonder, to go through the same farce a second time?

But, here again, is a question involved: how far will it be for us to decide? The Allied Nations are unquestionably the United Nations, a proud and just designation, as far as the great major purpose of the war is concerned. We will make no peace separately, we will make no peace at all with the existing powers of evil: so far so good, but beyond that? We in these islands have not (touch wood!) been invaded nor have the United States of America: we have not experienced to the full the horrors, the massacres, the abominations practised, for instance, successively and now concurrently on the Czechs, the Poles, and the Russians. As compared with these three nations, we are dispassionate—and amongst the Allies the experiences vary from deepest black to dirty grey. Each one therefore when each comes to the judgment seat will view this problem of German guilt differently: then there is Italy also to be dealt with, a country with whose people the British have for generations had a genuine friendship, and thirdly the Japanese, that unequal nation, blend of efficiency and barbarism which has recently been described by a B.B.C. spokesman as 'a twentieth century nation with a B.C. mind.'

There is one very real danger already beginning to

exercise many thoughtful minds. Burke may have been right in declaring that you cannot draw an indictment against a nation, though, as Lord Vansittart has shown, you can try; but you can undoubtedly, if victory in arms gives you the power, take vengeance on a nation. You can cry 'Væ victis!' and go to it—and if you, in the persons of your fellow-countrymen and probably also in those of your families, relations, and friends, have suffered grievously, the temptation to do so may be overwhelming. The danger is that at the moment of that victory the coming of which is now inevitable (in spite of Hitler's last hope, the intensified menace of the U-boats) the Allied Nations may not remain united. The Russians, Poles, and Czechs have terrible scores to settle—and, as we should remember, the Germans are past masters in the art of organising sympathy. There is real need for the leaders of the Allied Nations to formulate, together and in advance, their agreed policy on this matter which will have its resounding repercussions otherwise on the whole terrific problem of the reconstitution of the civilised world. Are the Allies definitely going to punish the leaders, the orderers and executors of atrocity? So far as can be judged, the answer to that is an unequivocal Yes. But are they also to punish the people of those leaders and, if so, how and to what degree? It is not without significance that no Minister has, as yet, expressed the Government view on the argument twice put forward publicly by Lord Maugham, who has, after all, held the office of Lord Chancellor, that it is the enforced restitution of the goods stolen by the Axis Powers from the countries they have occupied which will not only be justice but also retribution.

There is, undoubtedly, great need for clarity of Allied thought on this and other matters. Talk of planning is in the air, but it can hardly yet be said to have reached the stage of international agreement, and the tendency of events after the fighting is over is bound to emphasise divergencies—unless adequate discussion and consideration takes place whilst we are still all in the cohesive business of fighting bitter battles in alliance. The making of war, in short, is a centripetal force, the making of peace centrifugal—and it is vital that that should not be forgotten or laid on one side to be dealt with later.

Take—to parallel the problem of the punishment of

atrocities, which sounds so simple and is so exceedingly complex—the problem of air transport, a description which it is generally understood—for reasons unexplained and perhaps unexplainable—is regarded in international circles as less nocuous than the words, civil aviation. Already there are the rumblings of dissentient voices here and across the Atlantic : Mrs Luce has declared to her American followers that the British are working to get entire control of international air transport after the war ; we, she says, have all the essential air bases, and these, it is to be inferred, should more properly be American.

Not to be controversial with our great and generous Ally let me put beside her view one not of a British commentator but a fellow national of her own : I take the following from the American publication, 'Time,' of February 11 :—

'The most effective guarantee for world air transport and its promise of world peace would be complete freedom of the air—the right of any nation's planes to fly over any other nation. Yet Britain for one, forced by war to the exclusive building of war planes and consequent neglect of commercial aviation, is hardly likely to agree offhand. If she did it would mean world domination of trade by the United States. Russia is in a like situation. So is China.'

That is fair comment, but even so it shows a certain misconception. It is quite true that, owing to the dire exigencies of war we have here been compelled to concentrate mainly on the building of fighter-planes whilst the United States has now a vast output of transport planes : it is therefore generally accurate to say that when the war ends we shall have the bases and the United States the planes for the development of world air transport—but this phrase, now creeping into the public talk, of 'the freedom of the air' means, if it is to have any reality, much more than its words grammatically convey. 'The right of any nation's planes to fly over every other nation,' that right which would, in general, be comparable with the accepted meaning of the phrase 'the freedom of the seas,' is really of little value unless it also includes the right of any nation's planes to land at the airports of any other nation—and that is, to say the least of it, a very different pair of shoes. But these matters are for agreement—in general principle at all events—between the

Allies *now* when we are strongly linked together in our common task of destroying Hitlerism, not hereafter when separatist influences may begin to re-arise. And it is at least of happy augury that the commentator quoted above should have included that reference both to Russia and China. They must unquestionably both be brought into what we may hope will be the great pooling not only of ideas and interests but of planes and bases as well.

So much I tried to urge in public debate, but the influence of any private person to-day, even on a subject of such importance with which he has been associated for over twenty years, is not only necessarily very limited but is often unnecessarily so. In the debate initiated by Lord Londonderry eleven speakers all strongly criticised the Government for its lack of policy, and I tried to say that we must be told either that our information as to this lack was wrong or at least that it would now forthwith be remedied: the public report condensed this speech into a statement that I 'said what their lordships must be satisfied with was that the subject was being considered by the Government'—which conveys precisely the opposite; and this of course apart from all omission of reference to Russia.

The economics enforced upon all reporting by the paper shortage are obvious and enduring; but at the same time it must be remembered that it is difficult for a democracy to function efficiently unless it can be based on the twin pillars of the freedom of the Press and the formation of public opinion. Public opinion cannot possibly operate if the Press fails to use its freedom fairly. On this particular subject, though the Government spokesman had no policy at all to announce, the Press united to represent the reply as satisfying to the critics—whereas it satisfied none. On a similar plane may be noted this, that early in the year Lord Beaverbrook raised in debate the vexed question of the equipment of the Fleet Air Arm: the next day he received a report in the 'Daily Express' which was 387 lines long, not counting the many headlines and crossheadings; the spokesman for the Government received fourteen—a travesty of accurate reporting.

All the above arises out of the growing talk of planning. Peace may certainly not be just round the corner,

but there is a very strongly grounded conviction that when it does come it will come with startling suddenness—even as in 1918, and a resolve that it shall not take the Allied world unawares. More than anything else has strengthened the realisation that this war has been, and is, unlike any other previous war in history—it has been more grim, more devastating, more widespread. It is the end of the old or the beginning of the new: we can never be again as we were—nor do we wish to be. To all must, or should, come new opportunity, new freedom, above all freedom from fear and freedom from want. Hence planning, if not in air transport and the international sphere, at least in most phases of national and individual life. At the moment of writing—mid-February—the greatest attention and largest number of words centre round the Beveridge Report. Criticism there is in plenty, support still more—but I have seen very little of the former addressed to what, to my mind, is the most dangerous precedent of the Report. The subject, social insurance, popularly termed social security (perhaps because ‘security’ in such a world as the present seems the rarest and most valuable of all things), is so big and so important that it called, surely, for investigation by a Royal Commission, impartial and above all non-party-political. Instead, it was thrown deliberately into the cauldron of controversy by being made the work of one man—with colleagues, to be sure, but colleagues who, after appointment, were told that as civil servants they must not attach signatures to any Report—an anomaly, in fact, an absurdity. Hence, we have for the future guidance of the nation the findings of Sir William Beveridge, than whom, admittedly, no single person could be better qualified, if—that big word—if a single person should properly have been called on in this way.

That the basic principles, if not all the details, of the Report will be accepted and become our law I suppose no one, even the most critical, doubts. They answer the need of the future which is not to be as the past. And yet it is perhaps worth recording a brief dialogue that took place between a highly placed official of a well-known insurance company and an M.P. Said the M.P., ‘What do you think of it?’ The official curtly replied, ‘A mixture of political trickery and economic eye-wash,’ to

which the M.P. cynically rejoined, 'What isn't?' The official, narrating the conversation, gave birth to the following comment which I cannot but think is a delightful piece of caustic wit—'What I really object to,' he remarked, 'is that the whole Report is based on the idea "never let the still good stand in the way of the still better"; a rotten argument; why, you could murder your wife on that!' He added, still in the vein of causticism, that it was easy to tell which M.P.s would not be seeking re-election, namely, all those opposed to the Report. That, at least, was a clear expression of the truth that the nation intends to have it—or its equivalent. But even so, I think some of the needless controversy is to be regretted, such as the description of people as 'defeatist' if they mildly inquire how we are going to afford it: Mr G. D. H. Cole has a little book, 'Beveridge explains,' which soon descends from explanation to abuse—and abuse gets no one anywhere. After all, the whole scheme is based on an assumption as to post-war unemployment which may or may not be found correct—and I know no one who thinks it probable that it will be the former.

But there is, regrettably yet undeniably, a note of harshness creeping into discussion of some of our future problems. It is all very well for Mr Malcolm MacDonald to say 'the first bomb that fell on Britain ended all class distinctions'; but that expresses at most no more than a pious aspiration: it is certainly not true. Much in the way of the old and unfair class distinctions have gone, but the inverted class distinction endures indomitably: there are many scores of people who are 'not only as good as their neighbours but a great deal better': they know it, if their neighbours do not, and will not hesitate to tell them so—and almost invariably these assertions are a proof of their real inferiority.

Something of this unenviable trait of human nature is perhaps to be found in the attack on our public schools, condemned by a sub-committee of the Labour Party on the London County Council—a condemnation since endorsed by the Council—these institutions, the main criticisms of which in the past were that they were for the elect, are now dismissed into limbo; 'as at present constituted,' we are told, 'they are both socially and educationally undesirable'; and the London County

Council will not play. I wonder whether its members like this from the pen of Sir John Squire any better: 'I suppose things will proceed in the same old way, and that the only decent education that any English child in most of the State schools can expect to have will continue to be the education that it gets outside school hours.' The two bitter ignorances almost seem to cancel each other—as such have a way of doing. Perhaps the truth is again to be found in Isaiah, 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now'; in other words, we have all been living under so great a strain that some such manifestations are inevitable—but, nevertheless, they remain immensely silly as well as unprofitable.

Security—what a lovely word, what an ideal to labour and fight for! And yet it would seem just a little peculiar that all the conferences, committees, and discussions (in the main, for there are the exceptions that prove the rule, I know) are concerned with matters material: even the Archbishop of Canterbury, speaking at a 'planning for living' conference made no reference to religious planning: 'our primary concern,' he said, 'must not be greater comfort nor amenities, but responsible citizenship'—good and commendable words in any layman's address, but 'primary' has a definite meaning, and the *primary* concern must surely be the growth of Christian life, upon which—for a Christian—all responsible citizenship must rest. But no one would wish to over-emphasise this point, and it is certain that the Archbishop's critics, such as they are, find fault not with his abstention from the affairs of ordinary life but his determined entrance therein.

There is, it may be both hoped and believed, a general stirring of consciences, if not private and individual, at all events public and national. We are all of us determined that some of the evils of the past shall not be carried forward into 'the brave, new world' of our plans and dreams. One good little example, and perhaps not so little either, is the relinquishment of our extra-territorial rights in China, the end of 'gun-boat' diplomacy as it has been called, after that had lasted just a hundred years: another, in the immediate field of war is the steady, if slow, clearing up of the divergences between Giraudists and De Gaullists, which led 'The Times' correspondent in

Casablanca to write, as recently as January 24, of Algiers as 'that beautiful but detested city . . . with its all-pervading stink of political intrigue.'

The drama moves: mightily we are all a part of history and conscious of that rôle. But still we continue to provide ourselves and the world with evidence of our strangeness. If the mentality of the German people is incomprehensible, our own—in, let it be admitted, a totally different way—is almost equally so. Only a week or two ago a friend of mine started on a journey as a Government courier: as such he had, perforce, a first-class compartment to himself. On the train, a very crowded one, were two other couriers each alone in his own first-class compartment: not merely commonsense and economy of space but also security would, one would have thought, have ruled that the three should be put together—but, no, the regulations lay it down that each should be alone, and alone each was accordingly compelled to be. Let us not begin to think that, even in this world of rationings and restrictions, there is any shortage of red tape!

And what a singular record is this Government publication, 'Front Line, 1940-1941'! A story to thrill and also to embarrass, a record of quiet, humble heroism and endurance, and also of a lack of foresight almost incredible, as witness three sentences taken at random: 'Manchester like most of the rest, was caught off guard.' 'For weeks in the big shelters (in London) there were no beds, not enough sanitation, no proper food, no hygiene, and no organisation to save women and children from queuing in the streets for hours to get a place.' 'In August 1941 came the constitution of the National Fire Service which absorbed, reshaped, and superseded the separate locally-controlled brigades.' None of these are written as confessions and the third is written almost with pride, instead of at least beginning 'not until as late as August 1941, etc.' And then, to illuminate as by a flash the other side of our national character, this from a Clydebank woman as she cleared away broken glass and debris in her shattered home, 'Well, there's one thing about these raids, they do make you forget about the war.' And these are the people the Germans are now officially exhorted to imitate!—how could they ever even begin to?

Among the singularities I find the attitude of many

young people, which may be but another way of admitting one's own advancing years. But of late I have watched several and all had the same three characteristics, though alike in little else : they demanded—not truculently or even insistently, but quietly and as a matter of course—a measure of independence which would have seemed quite fantastic to their seniors thirty or even twenty years ago : second, they were unprepared to shoulder the little troublesome preparations without which independence spells if not disaster at any rate discomfort, and, thirdly, they neither read the newspapers nor listened to the news on the wireless—in fact, so much the contrary that when the latter came on they one and all picked up books and immersed their attention in them. All of these, if the war continues another six months, will be in one or other of the Services : perhaps their attitude, conscious or unconscious, was a clinging to youth and peace, to all the things temporarily submerged by war.

And yet how easy, as our enemies have so often found, to draw false deductions from the incalculable British people. If in some respects we give, and deserve, the impression of casualness, even of incompetence or indifference, how much the more shall all who rely on that impression be deceived ! The other day I saw some thousands of young officers off duty at a big afternoon dance : well as I know—or think I know, for on this no man dare be dogmatic—my own race, I was profoundly stirred by the bearing and general appearance of these men ; there was a general sense of alertness both of movement and of mind—at ease as all were, free for a few hours of parades or martial necessities, from one and all only a single impression came, that here at last was a people on their toes, ready for anything to do, to dare, to die—and, beyond these trials, to live. And all classes, all services, and many nations were mixed, fused into one bond of brotherhood in arms, and those the arms of victory.

The drama moves on, and the changes continue underneath and above. A straw in the wind, perhaps, at all events deserving of record, has been the decision of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, after 91 years of exclusion, to admit women to full membership : as the Union's general secretary, Mr Fred Smith, has simply

remarked, 'this revolutionary change in our attitude towards women is of great industrial importance.' And do not let us forget that at last, in defiance of St Paul, women may enter churches without their heads being covered, and that the Law Courts have been graciously pleased to permit the same concession—and now women can be called up to sixty.

Probably we by no means fully recognise the extent of the changes big and little, permanent and temporary. In one domain any cookery book, even one published a year or so ago, will be a revelation. 'I'm easy to please in the way of food,' remarked Colonel Reitz, the new High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, on his first arrival at a London hotel: 'just bring me a couple of eggs and bacon.' The short account ended with simplicity, 'the waiter could not oblige.'

It has been a wonderful three months, this ending of 1942, this opening of 1943. Everywhere the light shines, the great river of our might sparkles and pulses with movement. Wonderful will be these coming months—and even darker into the abysses plunge the mad sadists of the Axis powers. It is as well, as our British habit is, to end not in the grand manner in which we always feel a trifle absurd and apologetic—though in days when an Englishman can parade the London streets unconcernedly in a lounge suit of light green tweed with a red tarboosh on his head it is difficult to be either—but in the way of understatement and humour. The one tremendous necessity now and in the years to come is unity between the Allies: that, I believe, is most firmly impressed upon us all: it is appropriate, accordingly, to record, first, that a lady in the United States has lately divorced her husband (an American) 'for having a British manner' and, secondly, that I chanced to be in company on the occasion when the B.B.C. announcer gave out as part of the news of the evening the words, 'Westminster Abbey is to be handed over to the American forces' and he paused, whereat a cry of dismayed expostulation arose from the listeners until he proceeded 'for a thanksgiving service'—and dismay gave place to a long 'ah!' of relief. We are willing to share our all with our Allies, but we are still ourselves.

GORELL.

Art. 9.—SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE BEVERIDGE REPORT.

WHAT I believe to be the first published work on economics, for I distinguish economics from political economy, was issued in 1691, having been written some years before by Sir William Petty. It was called 'Political Arithmetick.' Lord Shelborne, Sir William Petty's son, explained in the Dedication that

'things of Government, and of no less concern and extent, than the Glory of the Prince, and the happiness and greatness of the People, are by the Ordinary Rules of Arithmetick, brought into a sort of Demonstration. He was allowed by all, to be the Inventor of this Method of Instruction; where the perplexed and intricate ways of the World, are explain'd by a very mean piece of Science; and had not the Doctrins of this Essay offended France, they had long since seen the light, and had found Followers, as well as improvements before this time, to the advantage perhaps of Mankind.'

The Beveridge Report should be classed as political arithmetic, for there is no economy about it; it consists partly of politics and partly of statistical speculation. I would have been glad enough had its publication been delayed, not out of consideration for France, but perhaps even more important, to avoid the misunderstandings which in any case are likely to arise with the United States of America. The war-time generosity of America, by virtue of which we now keep body and soul together, is already a matter of some misgivings on the part of sections of American taxpayers. To choose this moment to announce that we have achieved 'security' is not therefore calculated to simplify the difficult and delicate matter of American aid, both during and after the war.

I regard the Beveridge Report, from whatever angle viewed, as little less than a misfortune and I propose to elaborate that point of view. I adopt the rôle of an Opposition which, though vital to our well-being, has long since ceased to function as the health of the constitution requires. We have passed into an age where consideration and compromise have become positive dangers. Almost every line I have read about the Beveridge Report, even from those who feel strong objections to the main principles, has been careful to contain at least a

qualified praise of parts. I am unaware of any attempt at root and branch opposition which says this thing is bad and for that reason should be rejected.

Only a year ago Socialist Members of the Ministry were dangling before our people a pretty picture of the perfect life after the war. Mr Ernest Bevin promised

'A society in which the sense of being well-off did not depend upon a contrast with poverty. Men should feel happy because of the chance to enjoy life themselves and to share its joys with others.'

Poverty amid plenty was to be abolished, there was to be work for all, and by the simple process of removing the profit motive, the mass of the people were promised a life containing more ease and comfort than had yet been within their experience.

In the spring of last year I first called attention to the food situation as it would be affected by the loss of our foreign investments. Between two and three hundred million tons of foreign food had reached us as interest on those investments and would now no longer be due to us. It was interesting, especially to me, to notice how the simple exposition of these elementary facts drove all the 'good-time' nonsense right off the public platform. The morale of the people as a whole was all the better for this simple, cleansing process and they were settling down to the realities of the situation. They were beginning to know that the winning of the war would be the prelude to the difficult process of paying for it and building up something of our previous position with its unequalled standard of living. That was a healthy frame of mind that must indeed be recovered if we are to surmount the problems ahead. I therefore regard it as a calamity that a soporific labelled 'Social Security' should have been brought forward to deceive the people once more. The inspiration of the Prime Minister's blood and tears and toil and sweat, founded as it is in truth, will be needed long after the war and Social Security as commonly understood is a dangerous opiate.

The Author. Three hundred pages of statistical and administrative detail offer wide scope for discussion of minutiae. To me it does not matter if the first and second child should be rated differently or equally or whether the cost is 7s. or 5s. 7d. The bigger question is

whether the child belongs to the parent or to the State. These bigger questions, and there are many of them lurking between the printed lines of the Report, make it imperative to start our discussion with some knowledge of the distinguished author of these proposals.

Sir William Beveridge was the brain behind the Lloyd George National Insurance Act of 1911. He may not have been responsible for the demoralizing slogan '9d. for 4d.' and I notice with relief that he has refrained from explaining how the present Report improves upon those terms, although it purports to give a shilling for 3d. The Act of 1911, setting up Labour Exchanges and initiating the national stamp-licking habit, was recommended on the ground that it would abolish unemployment. Up to that time the largest recorded number of unemployed had been in the neighbourhood of half a million and, in considering extensions of the same scheme, it is highly pertinent to notice that in flat contradiction to all that Mr Lloyd George said about it, the figure has since risen to nearly six times the size of the trouble which the Act purported to cure. It is crystal clear that if you pay for unemployment you will get it. That may or may not be an argument against unemployment insurance, but it is an incidental consequence of any scheme of the kind.

Sir William Beveridge is the spiritual son of Sidney Webb, now Lord Passfield, and was for many years Director of the London School of Economics. He is perhaps the greatest living expert on the machinery of government and has been responsible for the education and training of many thousands of bureaucrats. His mind works in terms of departments, functions, orders, research, statistics, forms, tables, and returns. A perusal of the Report itself confirms this view, for not only does it set up yet another Ministry, but proceeds to divide and sub-divide and re-allocate the functions of existing Departments, until only the expert can see clearly where the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Labour ends and the new Ministry of Social Security begins. Still an expert in administration, possessing a mandate to provide the machinery for an expressed public need, may well be accepted as the authority on the nature of the machinery required. To regard Sir William Beveridge as an expert

merely giving effect to an expressed public need is, however, all too narrow a view of the functions which he has, in fact, assumed in this Report. He goes far beyond machinery and method and takes little care to cover up his own pronounced Socialistic views.

'National planning,' he said, 'meant that some one on behalf of the State made a design of how the needs of all citizens could be met by use of their resources, and that the power of the State was used to ensure that effect was given to the design.'

I shall return to the constitutional issue later, but call attention in passing to the difficulty of fitting a statement such as this into one's preconceived notions of the democratic system.

In an article in 'The Times' on March 17, 1942, Sir William declared that 'the State must take direct responsibility for the control of vital industries and for the distribution of income,' making it clear that this Social Security plan is simply a step towards the ultimate Socialisation of the life and work of everybody.

Sir William's views on human nature are as erroneous as one would expect from the perfect product of a sheltered bureaucratic and scholastic career. Speaking at Plymouth on January 19, this year, he asked :

'How could one demoralize people by giving them the assurance that at the end of their lives they would have just enough money to live on without burdening their children ?'

Seeing that until quite recent times the safety of this nation has depended upon the acceptance by the parent of responsibility for the child and further, perhaps even better, the acceptance later in life by the child of responsibility for the parent, this question brings out vividly the nature of the change proposed by Sir William and those who think with him. If, in fact, the State can keep the citizen, the Beveridge Report is fully justified. If on the contrary the State can only exist at the expense of the citizen, a wholly different conclusion must be drawn. No one denies that in the advanced state of civilisation reached by other methods, the State is able and the people are glad, to provide both for children and parents in those cases where personal provision is beyond the capabilities of the beneficiaries. That happy state of

affairs can however only be maintained on the strict condition that such benefits are reserved for those who have failed to respond to the spur of necessity and are unable to avoid the need of personal help.

Sir William Beveridge is an ardent advocate of a second League of Nations now known as Federal Union. In his pamphlet published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs he lays it down that: 'There will be no *British* Navy, no *German* Army, no *French* Air Force, but British, German, French, Swedish, Belgian and other contingents of a federal navy, army, and air force.' That is a matter upon which every individual is entitled to hold his own opinion, but it is important to know how the author of Social Security regards the matter, because in the Report itself he makes it quite clear that his plans will only work if satisfactory arrangements are made with other nations. In the same pamphlet, 'Very considerable transfer of economic powers from the national to the federal authority—extending to final control over currency, trade, and migration—is recommended,' but to assuage the fears of those who may still hanker after a national place in world affairs he says, 'There will remain in any case a large field for national activity and distinctions, in education, health, social services, and local administration, in forms and machinery of state government, in ways of living and ways of thought.' Here speaks the arch-bureaucrat who visualises the means of living controlled by an international authority, but reserves to each country all those by-products of prosperity in which of necessity the bureaucrat specialises.

The Report adumbrates a revision of the present Parliamentary system, demands the creation of a new type of civil servant, insists on new economic relations with other nations and, in fact, leaves very little of what we now know and understand. These general matters transcend in importance the details of what is described as Social Security. It is of no real interest whether one stamp covers all services or how the proceeds of the stamp are allocated in the national accounts, if the stamp is, in fact, a symbol of a thorough-going revolution in the British way of life.

Constitutional Questions. The mode and method of presentation of the Beveridge Report call for comment,

for they show how far we have travelled since, say, Cobden or W. E. Forster or Joseph Chamberlain, set out with proposals no less vital in their nature. Arguments can be advanced for a change in our system of government; democracy as understood in Sir John Marriott's 'English Political Institutions' may have run its course. Something is no doubt to be said for French Administrative Law and there are millions on the Continent of Europe who firmly believe the totalitarian system to be the short cut to the perfect life. Revolutions are sometimes only discovered after they have occurred, but I doubt whether the British people would willingly permit the foundations of the democratic system to be undermined or removed if they were told in advance of the intention to do so. Warnings enough have been given, as, for instance, by C. K. Allen's 'Bureaucracy Triumphant' or Lord Hewart's 'New Despotism,' and whether those warnings have merely been ignored or whether the people have failed to understand them, they are very pertinent in considering the preparation and presentation of this Report on Social Insurance. The proverbial man in the street believes that we are a democracy. If asked, he would explain that the people express their wishes through elected Members of Parliament who proceed to enact laws, the administration of which is left to professional civil servants wholly unconcerned with the principles involved and exclusively occupied with the operation and administration of the letter of the law.

This Report takes this same road the other way round. It is the work of a number of officials, although signed by Sir William Beveridge alone, and is perhaps the most glaring example of many modern breaches in the democratic armour. These officials no doubt believe themselves to be interpreting the public will, a belief which is shared in another connection by Hitler himself and a belief which, even if justified, lacks the only proof known to democracy, the evidence of the ballot box.

The next step along the return journey from democracy is perhaps the most important of all. Having written their Report, these officials enlist the immensely powerful support of the State propaganda machine. Here arises an abuse of the very first order. This vast machine is a horrid war-time necessity, but a peace-time abortion.

For the successful prosecution of the war it is imperative that we should be told only that which is good for us from the military point of view; it is vital that what might help or comfort the enemy should be withheld also from us. No authority pretends, nor do the people expect, that news and views about the war will be perfected and purified by the normal processes of opposition, difference, criticism, argument, or denial. To put the matter in the mildest possible terms, it is not cricket to use such exceptional war-time powers, abhorrent in themselves, to tamper with the Constitution or to debase the character of British citizenship. Yet this is what has been done in this matter of the Beveridge Report. This is not the place to discuss the totalitarian microphone, a monopoly which to our shame exists with us, in all dictator countries and nowhere else in the world. War or no war, the cause which can gain the adherence of the controllers of the B.B.C. can afford to laugh at freedom of speech or the freedom of the press and can, by a persistent process of suggestion and suppression, set in motion a parrot-like chatter which passes for public opinion. This modern marvel has been employed to the full by Sir William Beveridge. The minor means of propaganda, such as the cinema and the mass-produced press, both of them quick to sense the momentary whims of the market, follow in the wake of the B.B.C.

The end of it is that forty-six million people are relieved of the necessity of study and thought such as was expended on Cobden's Free Trade, on Forster's Education, or on Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform, and imagine themselves to be convinced when, in fact, they have been merely doped.

Thus retracing our steps along the road from democracy, we reach Parliament reduced to utter impotence and able with perfect truth to say that, in accepting the proposals of Sir William Beveridge, they are in fact accepting what the people appear to think they want. If this is not totalitarianism in origin, in principle, and in practice, it is, indeed, a very near imitation of the real thing.

Several minor constitutional questions arise from the Beveridge proposals. Mr Lloyd George provided that certain classes of the community should be required to buy stamps and affix them to cards for the benefit of those

particular classes. It would, therefore, be inaccurate to describe the '9d. for 4d.' scheme as in every way analogous to a tax. The Beveridge proposals, however, cover everybody and impose in form as well as fact a tax, a sort of new poll tax, upon the whole adult population. The separation of revenue and expenditure is the very basis of British government finance. Parliament first decides how much it will spend on the necessities of government and then employs the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a separate, secondary, and subsidiary capacity to collect the needful money. To earmark a tax for a particular purpose is foreign to our financial ways. As long ago as 1890 this objectionable practice was tried and dropped; a special tax on beer and whisky was imposed to provide the money for the Technical Education Act of that year. Later on the proceeds of taxes on motor-cars were specifically allotted to the upkeep of roads and something of that irregularity still persists. The well-tried practice, notwithstanding these lapses, remains intact and Parliament is still free to allocate the public revenue at its pleasure as, where, and when it thinks proper. To impose a tax of so many shillings a week upon every adult and to earmark that money for special purposes is an extension of an abuse which, although tolerated in minor ways, has always been recognised as outside the rules.

The point has, indeed, already arisen, for the organisation known as P.E.P. proposes that the insurance framework of the scheme should be abandoned and that the cost of all the benefits should be collected as a Social Security tax *based upon capacity to pay*. More is likely to be heard of this demand, which means that instead of a flat 4s. 3d. a week, the better-paid workers will be charged more and possibly, though not so probable, the lower-paid workers will be charged less.

Economic Aspects. It may well be that as a People, a Nation, and an Empire, we have served our purpose and that the future course of history will be shaped without our aid. It certainly will be so if some of our politicians have their way. But if the gravity of the situation can be brought home to a people which is still British in breeding, quality, and character, such a doleful prognostication may yet be falsified.

It should be considered an offence to read the Beveridge Report unless and until a prior examination had been made of the present economic position of the nation. Our foreign investments have gone; we are living on the charity of the United States and Canada. We are the beneficiaries of a scheme known by the wholly inadequate title of Lease-Lend. In the Great War we made free gifts to all our European Allies amounting in total to twice as much as the American gift to us, but these transactions were expressed as *loans* and all of them brought trouble in their wake. This time America has literally lifted mankind to a higher level by, for the first time in history, accepting the theory that during war everybody should *give* everything. A large proportion of our necessary sustenance is thus coming to us as a free gift. As must be expected, there are drawbacks, such as pressure to relinquish large slices of our export trade, especially to South America. Such pressure is natural and submission to it imperative, but it is easy to see that our post-war difficulties will be enhanced in consequence. Looking farther ahead, it is obvious that there can be no continuance of Lease-Lend assistance after the war except on similar terms. American traders and taxpayers can hardly be expected to give us food while allowing us to compete with them in the Argentine. Yet when peace comes we must develop our overseas business, not only to pay for such raw materials as we may require, but also to provide the large quantities of food previously obtained by us as interest on our investments.

To surmount these difficulties, no thinking person doubts that we must develop our productive capacity to the limit. But for at least a couple of generations our working people have been systematically taught to do as little as possible for as much as possible and we have been infected with the philosophy of scarcity in other quarters. The organisation of trades to limit output and maintain prices and the adoption of a protective system have further reduced our exporting capabilities. We have indeed been too lenient with the economics of scarcity.

The workings of this virus since the lie of 9*d.* for 4*d.* are plain to see; prices of ordinary domestic requirements are roughly four times what they were in 1911. All these heresies have merely depreciated the currency, all the

benefits have turned out to be, not merely money, but worse, money constantly depreciating in value. Sir William Beveridge now proposes to add more millions of mere money and accentuate our difficulties in the international market.

The international market itself has been, as it were, at a discount for a quarter of a century. As I have shown in a pamphlet 'Hard Times Ahead?', Social Services have grown as foreign investments have diminished. Our foreign estate, quite apart from the devastating reductions due to wars, has been consistently reduced by over-spending at home and we have been living on capital. When the war ends we shall be left without the means to feed ourselves. We are six hundred and eighty-four to the square mile as contrasted with a Russian figure of twenty-three or an American figure of forty-three. Even if every one of us puts forth his maximum effort we shall be unable for a time to maintain the standard of living to which we have been accustomed.

Is it not the height of folly in such a dangerous predicament to talk about security at all? This Report is the Maginot Line of British economic existence. We must, as always, make what arrangements we can for such of our people as may be in distress, but it is simply wicked to spread the idea that there is 'Security' for all, or indeed for anybody.

An Attack on the Working Classes. So skilful have been the means employed to popularise the Beveridge Report that the wage-earners are left in ignorance of the size and nature of the burden it places upon them. To make this clear it is only necessary to go back to any previous socialistic scheme and notice how in every case the money was to be collected from the wealthy classes. Sidney and Beatrice Webb in 'The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation,' published by The Fabian Society in 1923, put the pre-war national income at 2,000,000,000*l.* They said that half of this total was taken by one-ninth of the community; that two-thirds of the population had less than 25*s.* per week per family on which to live; that two-ninths of the population, the black-coated proletariat, were subsisting on less than 160*l.* per annum per family, and that a small minority of one-ninth enjoyed the exclusive use of 1,000,000,000*l.* per annum or half the

total national income. The figures may be accepted without the implications drawn from them by the Webbs. They reveal the size of the changes that have since occurred. To-day eighty-five per cent. of the spending power of the nation is in the hands of the weekly wage-earner.

Sir William Beveridge had these figures before him, and it is not therefore surprising to find that he abandons almost without a mention the basis on which all similar proposals of the past have relied and says nothing about the wealthy classes whose half-share of the national income has hitherto provided all previous Beveridges with the excuse for their proposals. After half a century of the type of argument used by the Webbs, the impression on the wage-earning mind remains and it cannot be doubted that in contemplating the benefits offered by the Beveridge Report most wage-earners continue to imagine that the expense will fall upon others. In this respect, while the Report itself cannot be charged with dishonesty, the propaganda built upon it has been thoroughly misleading.

For this reason Part V, page 165, paragraph 445, is perhaps the most important and revealing section in the whole document. It recites the results of 'social surveys made by impartial investigators of living conditions in some of the main industrial centres of Britain.' It says that :

'In East London, while one family in every nine had income below the minimum and was in want, nearly two-thirds of all the families had at least 20s. a week more than the minimum, and nearly a third had 40s. a week more than the minimum; these were actual incomes after allowing for sickness, unemployment, and irregular work. In Bristol the average working-class family enjoyed a standard of living more than 100 per cent. above its minimum needs; one family in nine was in sheer physical want, two families out of every five had half as much again as they needed for subsistence.'

This deeply buried sub-section of the Report goes on to say that as a result of these and other surpluses, it is clear that the surplus income of

'working-class families above the minimum was more than thirty times the total deficiency of those below it,'

and therefore 'want could have been abolished before the present war by a redistribution of income within the wage-earning classes, without touching any of the wealthier classes.' In the meantime the war has for such purposes as these abolished the wealthier classes. It is not pretended that any further substantial sums can be extracted by way of taxation from the higher income levels. Thus the question of Social Security becomes an intimate, personal problem for the wage-earners in places like East London and Bristol, and if that can be made clear a variety of different views are likely to emerge. The nine families in East London with 1*l.* a week above the minimum are good judges of the nature of the trouble which has caused the one odd family, living in the same street, to be short of the minimum necessary to avoid want. They will know how far this want is the result of causes beyond the control of its victims and how far, if at all, it may be due to the absence of such thrift, care, and reasonable conduct as has provided the surplus 1*l.* enjoyed by the nine.

However that may be, this paragraph 445 marks very clearly the shifting of the whole basis of Socialism. There is no longer a mass of wealth enjoyed by the idle rich, said to have been stolen from the possessors of labour power; that story is a thing of the past. In the most explicit, definite, and simple terms Sir William says to the working-classes, 'those of you who have had the good fortune through your own endeavours to secure more than is needed to keep body and soul together, must now be made to disgorge part of that surplus for the benefit of one in nine of your fellows who for some reason or other is not so well placed.' The results of such an argument remain to be discovered: if it weakens in any way the thrift, care, effort, economy, skill, and general good behaviour which has produced the surplus now to be taxed or confiscated, some other word than 'security' may have to be found to describe the plan.

It is interesting in this connection to notice the progress of all these plans for improving the lot of the wage-earners by means other than their own endeavours. In 'Livelihood and Poverty,' published in 1915, Bowley and Burnett-Hurst put the minimum subsistence figure per family at 31*s.* 7*d.* Three years later Seebohm Row-

tree in 'The Human Needs of Labour' found the minimum to be 35s. 3d. Beveridge, who is at pains to explain that his figures are economical and make no allowance for recreation or luxury, says that at 1938 prices the minimum figure is 53s. and yet has the courage to budget for twenty years ahead. When the whole story comes to be written, it may show that these figures are merely figures, that these benefits, while undoubtedly of value in a minority of cases, by their wholesale application are essentially inflationary in their nature.

The wage-earner has another rather vital interest in these proposals which, unless it is stressed, is more than likely to be overlooked.

'The individual must be prepared to change his job if he wanted to go on being useful in a changed world.'

In that one sentence, skilfully and temptingly phrased, we have the complete story of the conscription of labour, compulsory migration of the family, and the final disappearance of yet another of our liberties.

These considerations were summed up by Dr A. A. David, the Bishop of Liverpool, who said :

'As the great Beveridge Scheme advances to its final shape we ought not to forget that social security will bring a weakening of the national character unless we are all prepared to make some return for it in public duty and service. . . . Not enough emphasis has been laid by the State, or taught by the churches, upon the obligations of those who receive social benefits.'

The position of all the voluntary agencies of thrift is not merely a question of machinery, economy, or convenience, but is closely linked with Dr David's misgivings. The national character is improved whenever an individual makes a conscious personal effort to provide against adversity ; no question of character enters into this or, for that matter, any of the many political plans now before the public.

I can only mention the gross injustice of an attack upon Industrial Insurance Offices and the whole world of self help, at a moment when from lack of man-power, paper, print, and other normal facilities the making of an adequate reply is a physical impossibility. Nor have I space to discuss the nationalisation of medicine as pro-

posed by Sir William Beveridge. Those who imagine that nationalisation makes for efficiency and progress will be attracted by the idea, while others who associate red tape with atrophy will appreciate the dimensions of the threatened danger. Funeral Benefit may have been tacked on to provide for the added risk to life, but as almost the entire population has made its own private arrangements for this specially private grief, it is a little cruel to expose it to the chilly processes of mechanisation. It is perhaps too late to protest against the application of the word 'Insurance' to these State schemes. The essence of true Insurance—Life, Fire, Accident, Marine, and the rest—is that the insured can always be relied upon to do his very best to avoid a claim. By contrast, these National Schemes, as is clearly seen with Unemployment 'Insurance,' are almost wholly devoid of that essential safeguard.

If a single sentence can sum up so vast a subject and such an overwhelming quantity of statistics and detail, it may be said that the Beveridge Report may extend the Social Services a little, but will certainly expand the powers of the bureaucracy a lot.

ERNEST BENN.

SOME RECENT BOOKS.

The Later Life and Letters of Sir Henry Newbolt. Edited by Lady Newbolt.

Life of Sir J. J. Thompson. Lord Rayleigh, F.R.S.

The Making of Tomorrow. Raoul de Roussy de Sales.

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. Prof. Eugene Tarlé.

A Short History of France. Sir John Marriott.

Constituent Assembly for India. Prof. H. Gangulee, C.I.E., Ph.D.

Air Commentary. Group-Captain W. Helmore, C.B.E., M.P.

I Say Rejoice. A Memoir of Christopher Benn. John Benn.

Victorian Photography. Alex Strasser.

A Dictionary of Abbreviations. Eric Partridge.

The Wolf Troubleth Not. B. Scott Montagu.

SURELY no man of recent years ever looked, played, and enjoyed the part of Elder Man of Letters, combined with Man of Affairs, *par excellence* more fully than Sir Henry Newbolt, with his finely chiselled features, his picturesque

silvered hair, his melodious voice, his gracefulness of literary style, patriotic idealism, scholarship, and historical erudition. The second volume of his memoirs, entitled 'The Later Life and Letters of Sir Henry Newbolt,' edited by his wife (Fabers), has lately appeared. At first sight it would seem a drawback that his final illness prevented him from carrying on the work himself beyond 1914, but it is actually no disadvantage, as many will feel that the letters to his family and intimate friends, which now make up the second part of the volume, show the real man more truly than the previous pages, written and polished for publication. Strong, both in narrative and letters, is his love of the country, but he was no cloistered recluse and was never long away from London and the attractions of the Athenæum, the Literary Society, the Royal Society of Literature, and other congenial meeting places. He greatly enjoyed mixing with people eminent in intellectual, political, and social circles and staying with friends like Lord Grey, Robert Bridges, John Buchan, or Lord Byng, or consulting with Admirals over his Naval History of the War, with artists on the decoration of St Stephen's Chapel, or Bishops and Deans on the Cathedral Commission. His poetry has delighted and inspired countless readers and its value is in no way lessened by the scoffing of some latter-day intellectuals to whom patriotic idealism is but the cause of a gibe and the 'Play Up, Play the Game' theme anathema. Newbolt's work will easily survive such critics—and even they are learning from experience of these present days of stress. Lesser toilers in the field of literature may find a shock, or perhaps a consolation, that so great a master of the language can at times write 'than me' for 'than I' and even split an infinitive! That he was a first-class letter writer his friends knew before and a wider circle will realise now, though it is to be regretted that certain passages detailing with evident gusto praise and flattery bestowed on his writings and lectures were left in. They pass muster all right when written privately to an intimate friend—when given wider publication they suggest a complacency and self esteem which are hardly fair to the writer. This is, however, but a very small blemish in a volume of most delectable refinement and interest.

It is fitting that Lord Rayleigh, a scientist of dis-

tion, should write the 'Life of Sir J. J. Thompson' (Cambridge University Press). Thompson was more than one of the greatest physicists of our time; although his career was mainly scientific he quickened life at many points, made hosts of friends, and ended a long and brilliant career by a Mastership of Trinity which will be long remembered. Lord Rayleigh has shirked no labour to make his book comprehensible to ordinary readers whose knowledge of science is meagre. Many of them will already be acquainted with Thompson through his own 'Recollections and Reflections,' but, essentially a modest man, the author left out, or only lightly touched on, some of his greatest achievements. Lord Rayleigh does not tell us where his hero went to school, beginning his story with Owens College, which Thompson entered in 1871 at the early age of fourteen. His father was a bookseller and publisher and, from these modest beginnings, Thompson adventured, by way of the Cavendish Professorship of Experimental Physics, to the great post of President of the Royal Society, Knighthood, and the Order of Merit, to a grave in Westminster Abbey. No less than twenty-three Universities bestowed on him Honorary Doctorates. His life was an inspiring whole; and his attainments so enormous that lesser, but more conceited, scientists would do well to remember Lord Rayleigh's closing testimony: 'J. J. himself was one of those who "continue throughout life in the practice of private prayer and in recognition of the Sacraments."'

Books about the present troubles of the world and their cause, and the years between the wars and dictatorship and democracy are legion, but a work of outstanding merit like 'The Making of Tomorrow' by Raoul de Roussy de Sales (Allen and Unwin) deserves a warm welcome. Though addressed primarily to the American people—and a careful and lucid analysis of the American way of life is a special feature of the book—the work should also have a very definite appeal in this country. Its section titles convey its scope—Nationalism; The Trend towards Collectivism; The Opposition to War; The Folklore of Democracy; Germany and the World; and America and the World. There are many passages which could be quoted with advantage if space permitted, but to give some key to the author's line of argument

perhaps the following will prove useful. 'It should not be forgotten that the real opposition to Hitlerism is not to be found either in Bolshevism, Capitalism, Socialism, or in the Jews. There is only one real peril for Hitler: democracy, and the principles on which it is founded. If he can destroy that, he destroys all the rest. This word—so derided by some to-day, so meaningless to others—contains nevertheless the essential idea of continuity and evolution, of progress and permanence, without which there can be no civilisation.' And, again, in summing up the German character. 'No other nation has tried to justify its quasi-pathological manifestations of brutality, lawlessness, and ferocity on the presumption that the whole world was leagued against it in some sort of fabulous plot. No other nation has complained so much of being tricked unjustly not only by fate but by every other single nation, whether powerful or weak. No other nation has practised with such consummate skill and persistence the double blackmail of trying to inspire pity as a victim and terror as a bully.'

Professor Eugene Tarlé's book '*Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812*' (Allen and Unwin) is a valuable contribution to an often described campaign, especially valuable in that it is written entirely from the Russian point of view and has had the benefit of many official sources of information not hitherto available. The book was written before Hitler's invasion of Russia and therefore the similarities and dissimilarities of the two campaigns are not stressed but they are none the less striking for that. The dominant character in 1812 was the Russian General Kutuzov and the reader learns clearly the many difficulties with which he had to contend; obstruction and disloyalty from some of his chief subordinates, the keen personal dislike of the Emperor Alexander and the carping criticism and complaints of the English General, Sir Robert Wilson, compulsorily attached to his staff. Kutuzov's firm determination was to get Napoleon out of Russia as quickly as possible and leave the winter to deal with his army. He did not want to risk Russian lives in pitched battles, risky as such fights inevitably must be, even though in the end he might achieve the spectacular triumph of capturing Napoleon himself. That was what Alexander and his entourage wanted—

some resounding triumph, cost what it may. Firm in the confidence of the rank and file of his army Kutuzov remained unmoved and even Alexander did not dare turn him out. The story of the great retreat has often been told before and is told again here without embellishment but most effectively. Rereading takes nothing from the grimness and horror.

Sir John Marriott is a master of the art of *multum in parvo* and a benefactor of the 'desert island' if that term covers the reader who, isolated from libraries and book-shops and compelled by circumstances to reduce his literature to a minimum, yet wishes to study a subject accurately. The popularity of Sir John's books is proved by the twenty-two editions of his 'Remaking of Modern Europe' and the many editions of his other well-known works. The latest is 'A Short History of France' (Methuen), which in less than 300 pages takes the reader from 58 B.C. to A.D. 1940, giving the essential facts of political and constitutional history with such reference to art and literature as may be necessary to fill in the picture. The book is a model of skilful selection and condensed narrative, giving much in well arranged and lucid form and in attractive style. If a small criticism be permitted, it is the lack of genealogical tables which would certainly help readers in the intricacies of the Bourbon, Orleans and Bonaparte families. Sir John does not attempt to indulge in historical speculation or theoretical philosophy and a narrative of fact does not lend itself easily to review, when the facts are so conspicuously accurate. But the book can be most highly recommended.

Professor N. Gangulee has done a useful piece of research work in his 'Constituent Assembly for India' (George Allen and Unwin). It is, however, vitiated by more than one false assumption. The Indian National Congress may be 'India's foremost political organisation'—it is certainly its most vocal—but it is in no sense truly representative, and when, in the midst of a world war for civilisation, the author speaks of submitting to the British Government the demands of Congress in the 'form of an ultimatum' he foregoes the right to be taken as a serious constructive statesman. Then, most Constituent Assemblies have been called into existence as a means of settling national affairs after a rebellion or

revolution as in the United States, France, and Russia. Constitutional developments within the British Empire have all been ordered and evolutionary. The Statute of Westminster was certainly not the result of negotiations taking the 'form of an ultimatum.' Ultimatums are issued by tyrants to inferiors; they are inadmissible between equals. Why does Congress fear the suggested Federal Solution? And why does Professor Gangulee entitle a long chapter: 'India rejects the Imposed Federal Constitution'? The sentence does not even make sense! It is sad to see so much industry and enthusiasm squandered for lack of a little clear objective thinking. Speaking of the phase immediately preceding the French Revolution the author says: 'The political immaturity of the French at this period needs to be repeatedly emphasised': that is exactly the position of the Indian Peoples to-day.

A dish prepared by a skilled cook and served hot at exactly the right moment to expectant diners is a very pleasant thing. If the dinner gets cancelled and the dish is kept till next day and is then reheated it is almost inevitably different though the skill in making and the ingredients are exactly the same. This reflection is prompted by reading '**Air Commentary**,' by Group-Captain W. Helmore (Allen and Unwin), and though we could never accuse such excellent broadcasts of being stale, yet they are not quite the same as when we listen with much pleasure to the Group-Captain himself on the wireless. 'At this very moment' or 'Even while I've been speaking' are excellent at the time but in cold print six months later the phrases seem rather to belong to the past. After this criticism let us heartily commend these twelve broadcasts ranging from Sept. 11, 1941 to July 30, 1942. The Author is skilled in mixing of grave and gay, giving serious information and lighter anecdote, and presenting life-like mental pictures both of events and of men to his readers. The book is well illustrated by striking sketches, beyond all question by Eric Kennington though for some reason not stated his name is omitted.

When the final indictment against Hitler is drawn up surely the greatest crime with which he should be charged is having caused the early death of so many fine young men in so many countries; young men who humanly

speaking would have lived to play useful parts in the world and win honourable achievements. A notable and charming tribute to one very gallant young man has appeared under the title of 'I Say Rejoice. A Memoir of Christopher Benn,' by his brother John Benn (Faber). Here was a character of striking individuality and straightforwardness combined with personal charm and a real joy in living. Christopher Benn had clearly developed as a remarkable musical critic and was beginning to achieve very real success at the Bar. Morally as well as physically he loved fresh air and open spaces. He had deep religious convictions and a natural power of leadership such as will be greatly needed in the remaking of the world. He, like so many others, lies buried in a foreign land—but 'his spirit goes marching on.'

'Victorian photography is far from being simply a matter of neglect and mis-use of photographic principles and possibilities as they are preached to-day. Nor is it such a glorious example of how to escape nobly to an Olympus of camera dreams from the lesser dream of snapshot reality. Rather we shall see that Victorian photography was a gallant struggle with the crude yet brittle tools of an undeveloped technique.' These words are taken from the introduction to 'Victorian Photography,' by Alex Strasser (The Focal Press), and give the key to a work which is well worth careful study. Photography is peculiarly Victorian in that its acknowledged birthday was in 1839 and by 1901, after many struggles, it had reached the artistic and technical status from which all more recent developments arise. The book gives a clear and concise account of the invention of photography, of the succeeding processes from daguerreotype through calotype and collodion to the modern film, and of the various photographers to whom the art owes so much—Henry Fox Talbot, Julia Margaret Cameron, Alvin Langdon Coburn, David Octavius Hill, Roger Fenton, and many others. There are also nearly fifty pages of really interesting photographs, showing what striking results artistically as well as technically the Victorians did achieve in spite of their faulty equipment.

Mr Eric Partridge's 'A Dictionary of Abbreviations' (Allen and Unwin) is most timely and useful and should be on every reference shelf. In these days the use of

initials to denote people, offices, societies, places, honours, and distinctions is altogether bewildering, and most people will be grateful for a guide such as this to help and instruct them. The whole alphabet seems to be insufficient for the task laid on it; hence the multiplication of meanings of the same letters. We learn that G.P. means not only general practitioner and general paralysis but also Gloria Patri and general pause (in music). C.O. means not only Commanding Officer but Colonial Office and Conscientious Objector. K.B. means not only Knight Bachelor but Kings Bench and Kite Balloon. Pub means not only a place of refreshment but also a publisher, while W.C. not only has its ordinary domestic meaning but also stands for War Cabinet or Wesleyan Chapel. Com. has no less than fifteen meanings and D.O. ten. There is not only much useful information but also no little entertainment to be found in this book.

The Quarterly seldom reviews novels, but when one arrives described on the wrapper as 'A Down-to-Earth story, starkly realistic, told with unexpected delicacy and pathos' further attention is invited. The story is 'The Wolf Troubleth Not,' by B. Scott Montagu (Hurst and Blackett), and if a down-to-earth story means one in which the chief character is an almost unmitigated scoundrel and attractive characters are almost nonexistent, the reader will not be disappointed. The life-cycle of Tony, beginning in a New York slum and rising by stages of sneak-thief, waiter, professional dancer, gigolo, blackmailer, and film hanger-on to the flaming heights of Hollywood stardom and then by inexorable nemesis steadily returning to the slums, is certainly striking. The picture of the fantastic life in Hollywood is well drawn, and the authoress shows her skill in creating a feeling akin to sympathy with the villain in his decay, when he sees all that is worst in his own heredity blossoming with baleful luxuriance in the only way that really can pierce his hard skin and leave him shivering.

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